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Refugee Women as Cultural Others: 
Constructing Social Group and Nexus for FGM, 
Sex Trafficking, and Domestic Violence Asylum 
Claims in the United States 
Meghan Casey 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The safari van jolted to a halt on the mud and ditch-covered road—if it may 
be called even that—amidst an expanse of land and sky. Clouds hung low after 
a morning of rain, and the sun timidly shined light upon the greenery 
interspersed in the Maasai village largely composed of rounded mud huts. Men 
vested in crimson-colored warrior garments greeted our group of Americans 
with proud nods and kind words, while women and children lingered in the 
small doorways of nearby huts and weakly constructed fence posts. Young girls 
with infants strapped onto their small backs timidly approached, prowling 
sheepishly behind nearby trees. After a demonstration of a traditional warrior-
jumping dance, our foreign group was led through the grass- and dirt-strewn 
grounds, into low-ceilinged mud huts that, while only a few feet in length, 
housed large families. 
At one point, our tour guide, a young and muscular Maasai warrior, 
stopped our group at the village center to explain a central cultural practice—
one, he explained, that was often misunderstood by Westerners such as 
ourselves. Female circumcision, he told us matter-of-factly, was an important 
practice and essential to Maasai culture because girls could not be inducted 
                                                        

 I would like to especially thank Professor Won Kidane for his guidance in the creation 
of this piece. I also deeply appreciate the support of the SJSJ editing staff and board, as 
well as my many friends, family members, and colleagues who share in a passion for 
global justice. Most importantly, I am grateful for the inspiration of refugee women, who 
continue to inspire me with their perseverance, faith, and hope. 
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into the fullness of their womanhood without it. He further explained, almost in 
an attempt to justify the practice, that unlike men, who had to undergo 
circumcision publicly without any showing of pain, women had an easier time 
because the ceremony was conducted in secret. A woman could not be 
accepted as a part of the community—nor could she marry—unless she had 
been circumcised. 
In the remote isolation of that African savanna, with little more than goats 
and cows for sustenance, minute huts as abodes, and an ingrained tradition of 
male-warrior protection—it was not so difficult to believe his words. How, I 
mused, could a Maasai woman not submit to such a practice without risking 
her own survival through community banishment? In that afternoon, I saw a 
mere glimmer of the vulnerability that pervades the lives of Maasai women. 
Social forces—ones that I could not even begin to articulate or comprehend—
had instilled in them a sense of subordination that seemed inescapable.1 
And yet some women do escape—whether by willful choice or by force. 
Today, women constitute the majority of refugees worldwide.2 In addition to 
facing the challenges of war, poverty, and natural disasters that so often plague 
developing countries, women encounter particularized persecution on the basis 
of their gender.3 These violent, gender-based atrocities permeate every part of 
the globe, ranging from honor killing in Middle Eastern countries to female 
                                                        
1 This anecdote details the author’s experience visiting a Maasai village in rural Kenya in 
May 2007. 
2 Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: A 
Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender 
Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 286 (2002). 
3 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND POLICY 946 (5th ed. Foundation Press 2009) (“International law ignores the persecution 
that girls and women endure, even die under, for stepping out of the closed circle of social 
norms. . . . Women are also abandoned or persecuted for being rape victims, bearing 
illegitimate children, or marrying men of different races. . . . There is no recognition that they 
need legal protection and refugee status both as individuals in their own right and as 
women.”) (emphasis in original). 
Refugee Women as Cultural Others 983 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
genital mutilation (FGM) predominantly in Africa to femicide4 in Central 
America to the domestic violence that pervades every society. Beyond these 
specific forms of persecution are culturally ingrained notions of female 
subordination. Because women possess few resources and are allowed far less 
financial or educational independence than the men in their societies, they 
easily become entrapped in cycles of emotional and physical violence. 
International recognition of the particular challenges faced by refugee 
women has expanded over the past several decades. Since the United Nations 
Convention on Refugees in 1951, many countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, have adjusted 
their policies to better address the needs of refugee women.5 The development 
of asylum law over the past sixty years reflects these efforts, as countries have 
taken steps to construct gender-specific guidelines for adjudicators as well as 
legal formations that address gender-related challenges. Such changes have 
provided legal language and redress for refugee women who would otherwise 
struggle to communicate the subtle nuances of their particularized challenges. 
While imperfect, these strategies help to ameliorate dormant but severe forms 
of gender discrimination that saturate a male-dominated world. In light of the 
1951 Convention’s lack of specificity in using gender-neutral language for the 
definition of “refugee,” these international efforts are especially necessary in 
                                                        
4 Femicide, or the violent killing of women, is a growing phenomenon in Central America. 
It is characterized by the following characteristics: savagery (mutilation, dismembering, 
etc.), rape or sexual abuse, politically significant messages (e.g., messages left on the body 
itself or nearby), identity destruction (such as damage to the face), massacres (killing both a 
woman and her children), and ritualization of the crime scene. CENTRAL AMERICAN 
WOMEN’S NETWORK (CAWN), FEMICIDE AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN, CONTEXT AND REALITIES 2 (2009), available at  
http://www.cawn.org/html/spring09%20version%20website.pdf [hereinafter CAWN 
Femicide]. See generally HEINRICH BOLL STIFTUNG, UNION EUROPA, CENTRAL AMERICAN 
WOMEN’S NETWORK, FEMINICIDIO: UN FENOMINO GLOBAL DE LIMA A MADRID 
[FEMICIDE: A GLOBAL PHENOMENON FROM LIMA TO MADRID] (Apr. 2010), available at 
http://www.cawn.org/assets/Feminicidio%20de%20Lima%20a%20Madrid.pdf. 
5See Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: a 
Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 779–80 (2003) 
[hereinafter Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus]. 
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order to secure equal protection for refugee women who were not present, 
either practically or conceptually, for the original construction of these refugee 
protections.6 
Still, the United States has struggled to follow suit. In the extremely 
convoluted realm of asylum law, which theoretically provides micro-level 
solutions to macro-level global problems, American courts have tried 
unsuccessfully to formulate legal theories that address the specific needs of 
refugee women. Due largely to the arbitrariness that characterizes US 
immigration law, there is no consistent, cognizable legal framework for 
gender-based asylum claims. Instead, judges are left to force factors of gender 
and cultural concern into the male-centered legal constructions of asylum law. 
Thus, the lack of jurisprudential consensus for gender-based asylum claims has 
resulted in widespread misapplication of basic human rights principles and 
counterintuitive asylum denials of viable claims. To be granted asylum in the 
United States, an applicant must show that she fits into one of five statutorily 
defined categories, and that there is a connection, or “nexus,” between the 
alleged persecution and one of these groups.7 Of primary concern in this article 
is the “social group” category, from which most gender-based claims are 
construed. 
Specifically, it is problematic that US courts give undue weight to relativist 
notions of the cultural Other8 in their construction of “social group” and 
                                                        
6 Although international human rights law has, from the outset, applied to men and women 
equally, women have long experienced gross inequalities in the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights. HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 248 (2d ed. 2009). Also, in the aftermath of World 
War II, the primary focus of the negotiating states was ending the atrocities committed 
during the war. Protections that focus on civil and political harms (as opposed to those 
encompassing private, domestic affairs) have traditionally been the focus of refugee 
protection and human rights in general. Martina Pomeroy, Left out in the Cold: Trafficking 
Victims, Gender, and Misinterpretation of the Refugee Convention’s “Nexus” Requirement, 
16 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 453, 470–71 (2010). 
7 See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
8 The philosophical notion of women as Others was first developed by Simone de Beauvoir. 
In her work The Second Sex, she bases the construct of the Other on Hegel’s account of a 
master-slave relationship: “The situation of women is comparable to the condition of the 
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“nexus” within the definition of a “refugee.” Their focus narrows in on the 
intent of the persecutor and the division of public and private spheres, which 
prevents an accurate understanding of the subtle forces that subordinate 
refugee women. In addition, courts impute gender-related motives to other 
grounds for asylum, such as political opinion or religion, thereby clouding any 
real recognition of gender-based persecution. They fail to consider the unique 
societal role of refugee women in their reluctance to consider common past 
experience as an immutable characteristic for the purposes of constructing a 
social group. Furthermore, courts ironically require a showing of social 
visibility for groups that are in fact relegated to the invisible shadows of 
society. 
These interpretive failures indicate judicial and legal biases—whether 
conscious or subconscious—that view refugee women as cultural Others who, 
to some extent, should be the products of their own respective cultures. As 
discussed below, some cultures are accepting of practices that violate 
internationally recognized women’s rights. Yet, in a multicultural American 
society defined by the acceptance and preservation of individual identity, 
people can often justify abhorrent acts or practices out of respect for cultural 
difference.9 Thus, deep-rooted notions of American individualism make it 
likely that application of asylum law—while entrenched in notions of 
                                                                                                                     
Hegelian Other in that men . . . identify themselves as the Subject, the absolute human type, 
and measuring women by this standard, identify women as inferior.” Debra Bergoffen, 
Simone de Beauvoir, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed. 
2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/beauvoir/#SecSexWomOth. This article 
uses the concept of the Other as a vehicle not only to explore gender oppression, but also to 
analyze the influence of culture on gender socialization. In its exploration of cross-cultural 
gender issues in the context of international human rights, it elucidates Beauvoir’s 
proposition that, globally, women “lack the solidarity and resources of the Hegelian Other 
for organizing themselves into a ‘we’ that demands recognition.” Id. 
9 See Nilda Rimonte, A Question of Culture: Cultural Approval of Violence Against Women 
in the Pacific-Asian Community and the Cultural Defense, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1311, 1317 
(1991) (discussing cases where sentences were mitigated for domestic abuse and rape in 
criminal prosecution of Pacific Asian men based on rationales of cultural relativism) (“The 
urge to protect culture can function as a sanction for violence. . . .  American culture . . . 
perceives the individual as separate from the physical world and others.”). 
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international human rights—would also try to respect the nuances of cultural 
differences. However, this article proposes that US asylum jurisprudence 
should strive to eradicate such biases because they contravene fundamental 
concepts of human rights. The construction of social group and nexus for 
female asylum-seekers should be formulated in a way that (1) recognizes 
common past experience as an immutable characteristic, (2) does not 
misconstrue gender issues under other grounds for asylum relief, (3) does not 
barricade the private sphere from state protection, and (4) places less emphasis 
on the subjective intent of the persecutor. This formulation, by refusing to 
portray refugee women as cultural Others, would apply to situations of 
persecution across the globe because it recognizes inherent, transcultural 
concepts of human dignity. Ultimately, this less rigid jurisprudential solution 
would lead to more consistent, just outcomes in evaluations of refugee status. 
This article will analyze three specific types of gender-based asylum claims 
to demonstrate global application of this proposed construction: (1) female 
genital mutilation (which takes place primarily in various countries in Africa); 
(2) sex trafficking (which takes place worldwide, but primarily in Eastern 
Europe and Asia); and (3) domestic violence (a global phenomenon, though in 
light of recent developments in US jurisprudence, the focus here will be 
Central America). This analysis will first provide a global overview of refugee 
women, including background on these three specific types of persecution, as 
well as an explanation of various international actors’ constructions of gender-
based asylum claims. Next, a description of current US asylum jurisprudence 
will explain how victims of the three types of persecution are typically treated 
in American immigration law. Finally, a jurisprudential construction will be 
proposed, tackling the specific categories of social group and nexus devoid of 
notions of cultural Otherness. 
The personal narratives that preface each subsection of this article stem from 
my experiences traveling in Kenya and Nicaragua during the summers of 2007 
and 2010. They also include my perspective garnered from working in an 
immigration legal clinic for a nonprofit agency in Boston, Massachusetts, and 
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an agency advocating for unrepresented immigrant detainees at the Northwest 
Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington. These reflections are especially 
informed by my work as a legal advocate for refugee women and domestic 
violence survivors from Africa, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Middle 
Eastern countries. The narratives are also bolstered by my studies of gender 
disparities in Africa and Latin America, international human rights, and 
volunteer work with immigrant communities in the United States and Italy. 
To begin, the terminology used in this article must be discussed. First of all, 
I use the phrase “gender-based asylum claims” to refer solely to claims of 
persecution related to a refugee’s identity as a woman and the forms of 
violence derived from that identity. However, this language choice was made 
merely for the purpose of narrowing the scope of this topic. Gender identity 
encompasses much more than basic distinctions between the masculine and 
feminine. The severe forms of persecution faced by the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) community throughout the world should not be 
overlooked, and that population likewise encounters many of the same 
challenges in US asylum law as refugee women. Within the limits of this 
article, however, their plight cannot be adequately addressed.10 
In addition, this article assumes a non-relativist position and therefore 
chooses to use the term “Female Genital Mutilation,” or FGM, in lieu of the 
term, “Female Genital Cutting,” or FGC.11 Proceeding from the assumption 
that there are fundamentally shared human rights that transcend borders and 
                                                        
10 For further information on gender-based claims by the LGBT community, see generally 
Michael A. Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and Immigration 
Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 475, 501–12 (2002) (arguing against asylum in cases where 
claimed persecution is based on conduct rather than status); William Branigan, Gays’ Cases 
Help to Expand Immigrants’ Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1996, at A1; Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990); Cornejo v. Ashcroft, 116 Fed. Appx. 900, 903 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (unpublished memorandum) (acknowledging “overt discrimination against gays” 
in Peru but affirming BIA denial of asylum); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir. 
2005) (recognizing asylum claim for a Lebanese gay man). 
11 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 971 (“Those who see FGM as a cultural norm 
that the United States should tolerate object to the word ‘mutilation,’ preferring to call it 
female genital ‘surgery’ or ‘cutting.’”). 
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cultures, use of the word “mutilation” conveys the message that this practice is 
an act that should be condemned, while the word “cutting” is a more objective 
description of what the ritual in fact entails. Even despite its cultural 
importance, the international community considers FGM to be a human rights 
violation, and the United States has outlawed the practice.12 
Next, the term “alien,” though widely used as a term of art in the realm of 
immigration law, has a facially negative connotation. It implies an inherent 
“otherness” in the person to whom it refers and it presumes that such a 
person—though perhaps foreign-born—does not belong in the United States.13 
This article thus avoids use of this term, and instead chooses the less 
condemning term, “noncitizen,” to refer to individuals who have uncertain 
legal status in the United States.  
II.  A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF REFUGEE WOMEN 
A Congolese Woman, a Weapon of War14 
After fleeing the Democratic Republic of the Congo in fear for her life, 
Mariam arrived in Boston merely weeks before our first meeting in early 
                                                        
12 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women recognize that practices harmful to women such as 
[FGM] [sic] are violations of human rights. Lisa Frydman & Kim Thuy Seelinger, Kasinga’s 
Protection Undermined? Recent Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, in 
13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1074 (Sept. 1, 2008). Also, in IIRIRA § 645, Congress made 
FGM a federal criminal offense, punishable by up to five years in prison. Legomsky, supra 
note 3, at 973. 
13 See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1. (“[T]he word “alien,” even when not 
adorned with the modifier “illegal,” has always struck a disturbing chord. Many feel that the 
term connotes dehumanizing qualities of either strangeness or inferiority (space aliens come 
readily to mind) and that its use builds walls, strips human beings of their essential dignity, 
and needlessly reinforces an ‘outsider’ status.”). 
14 For more information on the horrific incidents of mass rape in the Congo, see Laura 
Smith-Spark, How did rape become a weapon of war? BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2004, 4:39 PM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm. See generally REBECCA FEELY, CTR. FOR 
AMERICAN PROGRESS, GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING CONFLICT AND SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO (Mar. 2008), available at  
http://www.enoughproject.org/files/CongoSerious.pdf. 
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September 2008. Her story was not unlike others that passed through the 
confines of our office, and yet in a most real way, she represented for me the 
epitome of suffering experienced by all refugee women. 
Speaking rather awkwardly through an interpreter, Mariam spun out her 
story in bits and pieces as I coaxed her with questions. Her husband had been 
targeted by Congolese forces as a result of his Rwandese nationality—having 
received threats and beatings, he was eventually detained and killed. 
Throughout the course of his persecution, Mariam was likewise targeted, 
and—as is common in such war-torn countries today15—her persecution 
manifested itself in a very gender-specific way. On several occasions, Mariam 
was raped and beaten by the same men that eventually killed her husband. 
Though she was able to narrowly escape her country with the assistance of a 
friend, she left behind five children. Days after she arrived in the United 
States, she gave birth to a baby girl, the result of one of the rapes that had 
taken place. As Mariam spoke, she asked at one point if she could breast-feed 
her baby. With this child in her arms, she tried to recall the last time that she 
had heard of her other children’s whereabouts. That image—of Mariam 
nurturing her US citizen child as she told me the gruesome details of her 
persecution—dramatized the particular burdens that refugee women carry 
with them across the globe. 
Eighty percent of refugees and displaced persons worldwide are women and 
children.16 Although all refugees—regardless of gender—are driven from their 
home countries by war, political strife, and natural disaster, women encounter 
particularized forms of persecution on the basis of their gender identities even 
during times of peace and relative stability.17 
In addition to the forms of persecution discussed in this article (FGM, sex 
trafficking, and domestic violence), women are subjected to dowry deaths, 
coerced or forced adherence to religious dress codes, and are the victims of 
                                                        
15 Smith-Spark, supra note 14. 
16 Randall, supra note 2, at 286. 
17 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 946. 
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mass rape used as a weapon of war. Gender inequality is present in virtually all 
societies: women are often excluded or underrepresented in state and social 
institutions; they receive unequal pay and inadequate reproductive health care; 
and they have less access to general health services, education, and other 
resources. Often, women are left in the exclusive role of child caretaker and 
domestic worker.18 The specific manifestations of persecution discussed below 
are therefore part of a wider pattern of female discrimination.19 
Given that the majority of refugee women come from developing nations 
with oppressive societal norms for women, the reception of these refugees into 
nations of the liberal democratic West can result in constructions of them as 
cultural Others.20 The concept of Otherness is a human experience of 
“difference, of not belonging, of the unknown,” and is particularly dramatized 
for groups who have experienced forced exile, such as refugee women.21 In the 
context of asylum law, these undertones of foreignness and strangeness are 
further complicated by the “power relations inherent in the encounter between 
the receiving country and its migrants.”22 
Social and theoretical constructions of the Other inform relativist thinking. 
For example, in their home countries, women can be viewed as “legitimate 
victims,” who are seen as having little or no reason to complain about their 
                                                        
18 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 285–86. 
19 ANDREJ ZERNOVSKI, COUNCIL OF EUROPE COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION, REFUGEES, AND 
POPULATION, GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS TO ASYLUM 8 (2010), available at  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc10/EDOC12350.pdf [hereinafter 
Council of Europe Report]. 
20 Randall, supra note 2, at 281. 
21 Diana Wong, Asylum as a Relationship of Otherness: A Study of Asylum Holders in 
Nuremberg, Germany, 4 J. REF. STUD. 150, 153 (1991). “[T]he biography of the political 
refugee is marked by the trauma of persecution, the trauma of flight and–last but not least–
the trauma of arrival all of which are sources of additional emotional stress which have to be 
given careful consideration.” Id. at 161. This also relates to Beauvoir’s theory of the Other 
because, as she explores, they “cannot call on a bond of shared history to reestablish their 
lost status . . . dispersed among the world of men, they identify themselves in terms of the 
differences of their oppressors . . . rather than with each other.” Bergoffen, supra note 8. 
22 Wong, supra note 21, at 152. 
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victimization because they belong to an inferior social class.23 Yet, through the 
reasoning of cultural relativism, there is no need to force the particularities of 
one culture to conform to the values of another.24 Undertones of cultural 
relativism within the asylum system would therefore permit justification of 
such “legitimate victims” even though US societal norms would not.25 
Rationalizing the idiosyncrasies  of world cultures, however, allows for 
limitless methods of subjugation and violence under an illusory guise of 
cultural respect. Though they are often not recognized as such, the three forms 
of persecution discussed in this article are mere symptoms of an underlying 
disease of global female subordination often perpetuated by relativist thinking. 
A.  Three Types of Persecution 
1. Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 
An estimated 130 million women worldwide have been affected by some 
form of FGM, with over three million girls at risk of undergoing the practice 
every year.26 Performed predominantly in numerous African tribes, FGM has 
special cultural significance because it signifies a girl’s transition into 
adulthood. Usually, the procedure is performed by female members of a tribe 
upon girls of a young age—and especially before marriage.27 There is immense 
                                                        
23 Rimonte, supra note 9, at 1315. 
24 Id. at 1321 (“[T]hose who advocate use of the cultural defense . . . are respectful of the 
idiosyncratic cultures of ethnic minorities, and, by accepting cultural explanations of an 
individual’s behavior, they affirm the validity and dignity of all cultures. This is cultural 
relativism at its best, sending a message that cultures are equal to one another, and cannot, 
and should not, be comparatively valued.”). 
25 See id. 
26 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 8. See also Mary Nyangweso Wagila, Beyond 
Facts to Reality: Confronting the Situation of Women in “Female Circumcising” 
Communities, in J. HUM. RTS. 6, 393, 400 (2007) (“Reports indicate that out of every one 
thousand females who undergo female circumcision, seventy women die as a result.”). 
27 Wagila, supra note 26, at 406 (“No woman is allowed to get married without being 
circumcised. Uncircumcised girls are warned about the possibility of ostracization [sic] and 
rebuke by the whole family. They are threatened that they will not get husbands. If married, 
they are threatened with the possibilities of misfortunes such as barrenness, still births, 
deaths of husbands, and even their own death.”). 
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social pressure to have the procedure performed, as the procedure often centers 
around traditions of elaborate ceremonies as well as the cultural emphasis on 
fertility and the production of children.28 Although the practice is integral to 
many social and cultural systems of indigenous communities, it is also directly 
associated with oppressive societal norms such as early marriage and limited 
educational opportunities.29 The actual physical procedure of FGM is 
extremely invasive, poses substantial health risks, and results in deprivation of 
sexual pleasure as a means of female subordination. It can range from “partial 
removal of the clitoris and/or prepuce (Type I, clitoridectomy) or clitoris and 
inner or outer labia (Type II, excision), to partial closure of the vaginal opening 
created by cutting and healing of the labia (Type III, infibulation), to other 
vaginal pricking, scraping, or cauterization (Type IV).”30 Often, FGM is 
performed under unsanitary ritual conditions with broken glass or unclean 
blades.31 The short-term consequences of FGM include severe pain and 
bleeding, infection (septicemia, tetanus, HIV, etc.), immobility, and urinary 
retention.32 Long-term physical consequences include “formation of abscesses, 
keloid scarring, infertility, accumulation of menstrual fluid, and serious 
complications during pregnancy and childbirth, such as postpartum 
hemorrhage, stillbirth, and low birth weight.”33 Psychological impacts of FGM 
can “include eating and sleeping disorders, recurring nightmares, panic attacks, 
difficulty concentrating and learning, and permanent loss of erotic and sexual 
sensation.”34 Often, such health risks arise from the fact that FGM is usually 




29 Id. at 399. 





35 Wagila, supra note 26, at 400 (“Most often, unsterilized instruments are used, including 
knives, razorblades, scissors, thorns, and pieces of glass. Because circumcision takes place in 
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Although rates of FGM have decreased in some areas as a result of 
international efforts over the past decades to eliminate it, many countries are 
still unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protections.36 The inability of 
governments to eradicate the practice can be attributed to their lack of 
commitment and failure to construct sensitive, practical strategies.37 Despite 
international efforts to condemn the practice, often countries do not—or 
cannot—respond sufficiently to such external pressure.38 
2. Sex Trafficking 
Trafficking in persons has been referred to as modern-day slavery.39 Under 
the Palermo Protocol adopted by the United Nations in 2000, this term is 
defined as: 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power 
or of a position of vulnerability or deception or the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person 
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.40 
                                                                                                                     
a group setting, these instruments are used on more than one person, increasing the risk of 
infection.”). 
36 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 8. 
37 Wagila, supra note 26, at 406. 
38 In the case of Kenya, for example, laws enacted to criminalize the practice were solely the 
products of external pressure but did not reflect the intent of local communities to eradicate 
the practice. FGM has been recognized as a violation of the rights of women and children, 
including bodily integrity, self-determination, freedom of choice, and sexual fulfillment. It is 
also considered a form of torture and violation of the 1984 United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CATCID). Id. at 402. 
39 CLARE M. RIBANDO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARRIBBEAN  1  (2007). 
40 Stephen Knight, Asylum from Trafficking: A Failure of Protection, in IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 
2 (July 2007), available at  
http://www.childtrafficking.com/Docs/knight_immigration_tra_0708.pdf. See also Pomeroy, 
supra note 6, at 454 (quoting Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 3(a), G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th 
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The severe exploitation that characterizes sex trafficking can include 
abduction, incarceration, rape, sexual enslavement, enforced prostitution, 
forced labor, physical beatings, starvation, and the deprivation of medical 
treatment.41 Many trafficking victims originate from South and Southeast Asia 
or the former Soviet Union, but human trafficking is also a growing problem in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.42 In fact, it is one of the most lucrative and 
fast-growing types of organized crime.43 According to US State Department 
estimates, between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked across 
international borders for forced labor or domestic servitude on a yearly basis, 
including 17,500 that are trafficked annually into the United States.44 About 80 
percent of those trafficking victims are women and girls, frequently between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty; at times, these women and girls become 
trafficking victims with the consent of their husbands or other family 
members.45 
Risk factors such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, history of physical 
or sexual abuse, homelessness, and drug use make women most susceptible to 
exploitation.46 In addition, chauvinistic attitudes lead to practices that 
discriminate against women, leaving them with limited economic opportunities 
and making them prime targets as victims. Restrictive immigration policies in 
destination countries create limited opportunity for legal migration and 
contribute to an environment ripe for trafficking to occur.47 In fact, trafficking 
is arguably a side effect of the recent trend in migration from the global 
                                                                                                                     
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001), entered into force Dec. 25, 
2003, available at http://  
www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_% 
20traff_eng.pdf. 
41 Knight, supra note 40, at 1. 
42 RIBANDO, supra note 39, at summary. 
43 Id. at 3–4. 
44 Id. at 4. 
45 Id. at 6. 
46 Id. at 8. 
47 Id. 
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“south” to the global “north,” which is generally motivated by the severe 
inequalities and lack of basic human rights that plague most of the world’s 
population.48 In light of the breadth and complexity of the global trafficking 
problem, the international community agrees that this severe form of 
persecution merits action.49 
3. Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence is defined as “purposeful behavior intended to control 
and dominate an intimate female partner,” which serves a “historical, culturally 
sanctioned purpose, which was and is for men to keep their wives ‘in their 
place.’”50 Studies demonstrate that batterers use violence to meet needs for 
power and control over others, and that batterers’ actions are often fueled by 
stereotypical sex-role expectations for “their” women.51 Women thus become 
targets of men, whose goal is to maintain power by subordinating women.52 
                                                        
48 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 455–56. The global “south” can be generally defined as the 
collection of developing nations generally located in the Southern Hemisphere and that are 
generally dependent economically on the global “north.” The global “north” includes 
economically developed and technologically advanced nations that are generally situated in 
the Northern Hemisphere. See Lemuel Ekedegwa Odeh, A Comparative Analysis of Global 




49 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 457 (“In 2000, the United Nations introduced the Palermo 
Protocol as an effort to address universally, for the first time, ‘all aspects of trafficking in 
persons.’”). Also, the United States has established a T-visa program which allows the 
Department of Homeland Security to grant status and other benefits so some victims of 
severe forms of trafficking. However, though the US Department of Justice estimates that 
approximately 50,000 women and children are trafficked into the United States each year, 
the statute caps the number of T-visas that can be distributed annually at 5,000. Id. at 459, 
460. The UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection for Victims of Trafficking also 
reiterate that trafficking victims may meet the definition of a refugee. Id. at 463. 
50 Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and the Violence Against Women in the “Domestic” 
Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 400 (2001). 
51 Anker, supra note 50. 
52 Sharon Donovan, No Where to Run . . . No Where to Hide: Battered Women Seeking 
Asylum in the United States Find Protection Hard to Come by: Matter of R-A, 11 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 301, 320 (2001). 
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For the purpose of demonstrating the societal role and effects of domestic 
violence, it is helpful to look at the specific example of Guatemala, a country 
from which recent and significant US asylum cases have originated.53 In 
Guatemala, society generally treats domestic violence as a private family 
matter, so it is difficult for women to seek the protection of local governments 
even if they are aware of that possibility.54 Although Guatemala passed a law 
in 1996 on intra-familial violence that required public agencies and actors to 
receive domestic violence complaints, very few women have brought claims 
for protection under its provisions.55 Spousal abuse is a particular problem 
within strongly patriarchal cultures, one which is exacerbated when alcoholism 
and sexual abuse are prevalent.56 Many women commit suicide when they can 
no longer cope with the abuse—the “shortcut” to escape unbearable 
situations.57 Even beyond battering in the home, women are frequently 
murdered by their intimate partners—and ‘femicide’ has been termed an out-
of-control crime within Guatemala.58 
The domestic violence that pervades every country across the globe 
manifests itself similarly, and often to an especially severe degree, in 
developing countries such as Guatemala. In fact, worldwide, one in three 
women has been beaten, coerced into unwanted sexual relations, or abused—
                                                        
53 See Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906 (Att’y Gen. 2001); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F. 3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010). 
54 Donovan, supra note 52, at 306–09. 
55 Id. See also Allison M. Reimann, Hope for the Future? The Asylum Claims of Women 
Fleeing Sexual Violence in Guatemala, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1199, 1212–13 (2009) (“In 
domestic violence cases, police often fail to respond to emergency requests for assistance. . . 
. Even when complaints of sexual crimes are filed, justice officials often exercise their 
discretion not to prosecute first-time offenders.”). 
56 Donovan, supra note 52, at 306–09. 
57 Id. 
58 More than 3,000 women were murdered in Guatemala between 2001 and 2007. Murder 
rates of women have increased much more quickly than that of men and are characterized by 
particular brutality, including sexual abuse and genital mutilation. Reimann, supra note 55, 
at 1208. “The mother of one murder victim has lamented, ‘People say, it’s only a woman 
who died, as if they were flies.’” Id. at 1212. See also CAWN Femicide, supra note 4, at 3. 
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often by a family member or acquaintance.59 Women in Afghanistan face 
brutal beatings and rape from their husbands—and subsequent persecution if 
they try to escape; those in Asia and the Middle East are killed in the name of 
honor; migrant and refugee women in Eastern Europe are brutalized for not 
conforming to the accepted social mores of their new communities; even 
women in rich, industrialized countries are beaten to death by their partners.60 
Like other forms of gender-directed violence, it is a discrete manifestation of a 
social mentality towards female subordination that states are all too often 
unable or unwilling to eradicate. 
III. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS ON GENDER-BASED ASYLUM 
CLAIMS 
Because this article proposes that uniformity in notions of international 
human rights is essential to effectuate just US asylum jurisprudence, it is 
helpful to consult international perspectives on the nuances of gender in 
asylum law. Although articulation of such universal standards is by no means 
easily reached in a world where competing ideologies reflect different political 
and social priorities, international actors have nonetheless taken steps towards 
achieving this end.61 The enactment of the United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was the first pivotal step, indicating a 
historic consensus on the perception of a “common humanity.”62 Additionally, 
following the Universal Declaration, many states have accepted legally binding 
obligations through formal conventions that include concepts from the 
Universal Declaration.63 
                                                        
59 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 249. 
60 See generally AMNESTY INT’L, IT’S IN OUR HANDS: STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
(2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT77/001/2004/en/d711a5d1-
f7a7-11dd-8fd7-f57af21896e1/act770012004en.pdf. 
61 LYNN H. MILLER, GLOBAL ORDER 189 (4th ed. 1998). 
62 Id. at 190. 
63 Id. 
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The foundations of refugee law are premised upon these shared notions of 
basic rights, guaranteed to all persons regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, 
or any other artificial social construction.64 The principle of non-refoulement—
the notion that no party shall return a person to a country where they will be 
persecuted—is the central principal of refugee and human rights law.65 While 
the claims of refugee women raise challenging and distinct issues, there is an 
appropriate analysis that fits within these principles. As refugee law has 
evolved over the past decade, gender has been a part of—and perhaps even the 
key impetus of—that development.66 
A. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
Other International Tribunals 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the key 
international refugee instrument, uses gender-neutral terminology that has, in 
part, contributed to the historical failure of protection for women refugees. The 
Convention defines a refugee as any person with a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
group, or political opinion.”67 The absence of gender as a Convention ground 
has created a historically masculine slant to the refugee definition that falls in 
line with an already male-dominated world. Because the definition of 
“refugee” arose during the Cold War, “persecution” came to be understood 
from an overwhelmingly male paradigm—one of political dissidence thwarted 
by beatings, torture, and imprisonment.68 Growing recognition of this historical 
                                                        
64 Id. at 209. 
65 Knight, supra note 40, at 3. 
66 Anker, supra note 50, at 391, 393. 
67 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 780 (citing Protocol Relating 
to Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 167 
art. 1.A(2)). 
68 Id. at 781 n.28. 
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failure to protect women has instigated international action to remedy gender 
disparities in asylum law.69 
Receiving countries of female asylum-seekers have made attempts to 
address the particular needs of such female asylum-seekers by issuing gender-
specific guidelines and modifying jurisprudence to better incorporate gender 
issues.70 The goal of these international initiatives is to include gendered 
perspectives into substantive and procedural aspects of the refugee 
determination process.  Currently, five countries have guidelines for gender 
claims: Canada (1993), the United States (1995),71 Australia (1996), the United 
Kingdom (2000), and Sweden (2001).72 Since 1999, the tribunals of three 
countries—the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia—have issued 
decisions addressing social group and nexus with interpretations that are the 
most favorable to the claims of refugee women.73 Additionally, in May 2002, 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published 
guidelines on both social group and gender claims.74 UNHCR also issued 
guidelines in 2006 relating to treatment of trafficking victims that explicitly 
recognized gender as an important factor in construing asylum claims for that 
                                                        
69 Id. at 779–80. In 1985, the Executive Committee of UNHCR issued EXCOM conclusion 
No. 39, which first recognized that gender-based claims could fall under the “particular 
social group” category of the Refugee Convention. Id. at 779 n.14. Also, in 1991, UNHCR 
issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women. Karen Musalo, A Short History of 
Gender Asylum in the United States, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 49 (2010), available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Ref%20Sur%20Quarterly%20Musalo_Short%20History%20
of%20Gender%20Asylum.pdf [hereinafter Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum]. 
70 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 780–81. 
71 Although the Guidelines’ stated purpose was “to enhance the ability of US Asylum 
Officers to more sensitively deal with substantive and procedural aspects of gender-related 
claims,” the Guidelines are not binding on the BIA. See Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and 
U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-Related 
Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1581 (2001). Furthermore, subsequent cases indicate 
that the BIA has failed to implement the suggestions. Id. at 1582. 
72 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 779–80. 
73 Id. at 777. 
74 Id. at 804. The Guidelines “unequivocally state that proper interpretation of the refugee 
definition ‘covers gender-related claims.’” Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum, supra 
note 69, at 51. 
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group.75 By contrast, commentators have characterized the US position on 
gender claims as lacking alignment with this evolving international 
jurisprudence.76 
B.The Council of Europe: A Parliamentary Assembly on Gender-Related 
Claims for Asylum 
In July 2010, the Council of Europe77 recognized the importance of 
incorporating the nuances of gender-based violence into asylum determination 
and procedure.78 Noting explicitly the vast differences in the persecution 
experiences of men and women, the Council of Europe’s Committee on 
Migration, Refugees, and Population issued a report that called upon its 
member states to set up asylum systems in ways that reflect gender 
sensitivity.79 As a preface to their report, which was based upon fact-finding 
missions by the Committee’s special rapporteurs, Council members articulated 
the specific aspects of gender-related claims that present challenges for legal 
systems worldwide.80 The Council recognized that persecution experienced by 
                                                        
75 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: The Application 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07 
(Apr. 7, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/443679fa4.html. 
76 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 778. 
77 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 334, 623. The Council of Europe was created in 1950 to 
promote democracy and human rights in the non-Eastern Bloc states of Europe. The 
European Convention has been renowned as the most advanced and effective human rights 
treaty system ever created, having reviewed hundreds of thousands of individual 
applications. Compliance with the Convention is supervised by the European Commission of 
Human Rights. Id. 
78 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 1. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 6–7 (“The present report enters into the framework of a set of adopted and 
forthcoming reports prepared by the committee with the objective of improving the quality 
and consistency of the asylum system in Council of Europe member states . . . As part of the 
preparation for the present report, the rapporteur conducted a fact-finding mission to Geneva 
on 9 April 2010 [sic] where he met with representatives of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Office for the High 
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women often differs from that experienced by men, but that asylum systems 
still tend to evaluate such persecution from a male-centered perspective.81 
According to NGOs and international organizations, states do not always 
consider the added dimension of gender when processing asylum 
applications.82 
The Council also articulated similar reflections on the definition of “gender-
related persecution” as those expressed in this article83—specifically, gender-
related persecution means that a causal relationship exists between the 
persecution and the victim’s identity as a woman. In recognizing this causal 
link, however, it is important to construct that identity in societal and cultural 
contexts that often impute additional dimensions to the notion of being a 
woman. The social and cultural demands, which arise as a result of biological 
femaleness, are therefore directly connected to female identity. Thus, gender-
related persecution is not necessarily the same as persecution on the basis of 
biological sex.84 It does not solely refer to an individual being persecuted due 
to biological identity as a female, but also because she fails or refuses to 
comply with the “social requirements” of being a woman within a certain 
society or culture.85 
In addition, the Council’s report made an important distinction between the 
relationship between gender and the form of persecution and the motivation for 
persecution.86 For example, a female asylum-seeker may be persecuted in a 
gender-specific manner for reasons unrelated to gender (rape as a result of her 
membership in a political party); she may be persecuted in a non-gender-
specific manner because of her gender (flogging for a refusal to wear a veil); 
                                                                                                                     
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and the World Organisation Against 
Torture.”). 
81 Id. at 2. 
82 Id. 
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and she may be persecuted in a gender-specific manner because of her gender 
(FGM due to her biological identity as a woman).87 Awareness of this 
distinction is likewise applicable to formulations of gender-based asylum 
claims in the United States, and it should be considered in constructions of 
social group and nexus. 
IV.  ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Sanctuary for a Malian Victim 
The ice and snow of Boston winters were an abrupt awakening for Kara, 
who arrived mid-December from her home country of Mali. The hustle and 
bustle of city streets, combined with the strangeness of foreign clothing and 
accents, contrasted sharply with the isolated, rural life she had known. As a 
woman in the Bambara Tribe, she knew the very distinct social role of being 
homemaker, obedient daughter, and future wife. Her world was one of stark 
divisions between male and female, power and subordination. Having 
undergone the practice of FGM as a child, she was ushered into an arranged 
marriage in her early adulthood as the third wife of a powerful local man. 
Yet, Kara resisted these culturally restrictive pressures and attempted to flee 
the confines of her forced marriage by escaping to Mali’s capital city, 
Bamako. After she had been tracked down by her husband and beaten for 
leaving, Kara decided to leave the country. In a fortuitous series of events, and 
after several months of hiding in Bamako, Kara managed to board a plane to 
the United States. During her time in Boston, she kept in communication with 
her younger sister, whom she had mothered and cared for since she was an 
infant. Kara was constantly in fear that her sister would be subjected to the 
same fate—having not yet undergone FGM, Kara’s sister faced this procedure 
as well as an arranged marriage with one of her cousins. 
By the time Kara met with me to tell her story, eight years had passed since 
Kara had first entered the United States. Uneducated, unable to speak English, 
                                                        
87 Id. 
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and wary of primarily male authorities, Kara never thought to seek help. I was 
faced with the difficult task of explaining to her that her chances of finding 
asylum in the United States were slim to none. Numerous obstacles—the one-
year statutory bar88 among others—would prevent her from making her case 
as a victim of persecution. 
B.  Current US Asylum Law: An Overview 
Building a successful asylum case in the United States involves a complex 
series of substantive and procedural hurdles. Within the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), a refugee is defined as a person with a “well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group, or political opinion.”89 This definition requires 
“proof of (1) an objectively reasonable fear of harm which is serious enough to 
be considered ‘persecution,’ (2) which is causally linked or bears a ‘nexus’ to 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political 
opinion.”90 The Attorney General may, at his or her discretion, grant asylum to 
a noncitizen who qualifies as a refugee within the meaning of the INA.91 But 
overall, the applicant bears the burden of proving his or her refugee status.92 
                                                        
88 “As a result of IIRIRA § 604(a), asylum (but not withholding of removal) requires ‘clear 
and convincing evidence’ that the application is being filed within one year of the applicant’s 
arrival in the United States.” LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1045. Legal 
professionals have significantly contested this requirement as the immediate priorities of 
refugees upon reaching the United States usually include locating friends, family members, 
food, and lodging. Furthermore, many refugees do not speak English and are not able to 
locate a lawyer to help them with the labor-intensive process of filing an asylum claim 
within this limited time frame. Id. at 1045. 
89 Id. at 892. 
90 Id. at 781. 
91 Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 2010). 
92 Id. The United States provides three possible remedies to refugees in accordance with the 
1951 Convention: withholding of removal, asylum, and relief under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT). LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 893, 1095. Because the 
application process for the former two remedies is exactly the same, this article will address 
only the requirements for asylum. A primary difference between asylum and withholding is 
that the latter is not subject to the one-year bar. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 
1045. 
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Procedurally, an asylum application is first reviewed by an Immigration 
Judge (IJ) during an interview with the applicant.93 The IJ questions the 
applicant about the intricacies of her claim, and determines the applicant’s 
credibility—arguably the most important factor for the success of a claim.94 
Fair and accurate determinations of credibility are often complicated by 
psychological symptoms of trauma and/or differing cultural perceptions of 
asylum-seekers.95 Indeed, failure to consider cultural or psychological factors 
in credibility determinations has led to skewed results.96 If an appeal is filed, 
an applicant’s case is reviewed by a panel of three judges on the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).97 A decision by the BIA can be appealed all the 
way to the United States Supreme Court.98  
Although in March 1995 the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) 
issued “Gender Considerations”99 in an effort to recognize the unique 
circumstances of female asylum-seekers, these guidelines are not binding on 
                                                        
93 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 894. 
94 See id. at 1005. In all applications for asylum, the Court must make a threshold 
determination of a respondent’s credibility. See Matter of O-D, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1081 
(BIA 1998). 
95 Stuart L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum Applicants: Don’t Be 
Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 729 (2008) (“Ironically, the dissociation 
caused by the trauma can adversely affect asylum applicants’ credibility as they attempt, 
with difficulty, to describe the trauma. Immigration Judges and Asylum Officers are 
understandably suspicious of factual accounts with conflicting, inaccurate, or missing data, 
but need to take into account the possibility that the very experience itself of severe trauma 
could be interfering with its description in an affidavit, an interview, or a courtroom.”). 
96 See id. Examples include “the case of the Guatemalan domestic violence victim whose 
PTSD was not recognized as a valid diagnosis because she was able to pay her bills on time, 
nor was the case of the Kenyan woman whose PTSD supposedly could not have contributed 
to her delay in filing for asylum because she was still able to attend church. Both cases 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of what PTSD is and is not. Traumatized 
people often avoid people, places, and activities that are unwelcome reminders of the original 
traumatic event or events.” Id. at 731. 
97 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 894. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 957 (“The INS Gender Guidelines review various relevant international human 
rights instruments. . . . The main goal was to emphasize to asylum adjudicators that gender-
related asylum claims are to be taken seriously.”). 
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the BIA and subsequent cases indicate that the BIA has failed to implement 
these suggestions.100 The discretion afforded to IJs and asylum officers is not 
to be underestimated. Statistical studies show vast and arbitrary disparities in 
grants of asylum depending on the background, experience, and gender of 
adjudicators.101 Such unnerving statistics make it all the more essential to have 
reliable, concrete formulations of gender-based claims. 
1. Social Group 
Of the enumerated grounds for the definition of “refugee,” the classification 
that is often interpreted to encompass gender-based claims is “a particular 
social group.”102 Under In re Acosta, US case law has interpreted social group 
to include “a group of persons, all of whom share a common, immutable 
characteristic.”103 This shared characteristic might be innate, such as sex, color, 
or kinship ties; in some circumstances, it might be a shared past experience, 
including former association.104 Particular group characteristics that qualify 
under this construction are determined on a case-by-case basis.105 Whatever the 
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the “members 
of the group cannot change, or should not be required to change, because it is 
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.”106 This shared 
                                                        
100 Karen Musalo & Steven Knight, Gender-Based Asylum: An Analysis of Recent Trends, 
77 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1542-43 [hereinafter Gender-Based Asylum]. See also 
Sinha, supra note 71, at 1582 (referencing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA Jun. 13, 
1996); In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated (AG Jan. 19, 2001); 
and In re S-A, Int. Dec. 3433 (BIA Jun. 27, 2000)). 
101 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372 (2007). See also LEGOMSKY 
& RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1039 (“In many cases, the most important moment in an 
asylum case is the instant in which a clerk randomly assigns an application to a particular 
asylum officer or immigration judge.”). 
102 See generally Randall, supra note 2, at 294. 
103 Donovan, supra note 52, at 321 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 
1985)). 
104 Id. at 321–22 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). 
105 Id. at 322 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). 
106 Id. at 322 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). 
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characteristic must make membership comparable to the other four grounds of 
persecution.107 Additionally, courts have considered the factors of “social 
visibility” and “particularity.”108 
Although many circuits have adopted the Acosta test for social group, the 
Ninth Circuit has defined social group slightly differently as, “a group of 
people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common 
impulse or interest.”109 Ninth Circuit courts at one point required that a 
“voluntary associational relationship” exist among the group’s purported 
members, imparting “some characteristic that is fundamental to their identity 
as a member of that discrete social group.”110 Since the Circuit’s 2000 holding 
in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, however, the test has evolved to permit an 
applicant to demonstrate group membership either by a showing of voluntary 
association or “an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities 
or consciences of its members that members cannot or should not be required 
to change it.”111 
2. Nexus 
Intricately related to the problems regarding courts’ constructions of social 
group is that of nexus—or the causal relationship between the asylum ground 
and the persecution. Asylum law’s nexus analysis involves a two-step process: 
first, a relevant category must be identified; second, a causal connection must 
be established between that ground and the applicant’s persecution.112 Yet, 
nexus cannot be entirely analyzed independently of the particular ground for 
persecution because the initial step requires an examination of against whom 
the harm is directed before the persecutor’s motivation for the harm is 
                                                        
107 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 784. 
108 See, e.g., Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of S-E-G, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Santos-Lemus v. Mukaskey, 542 F. 3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008). 
109 Donovan, supra note 52, at 323 (citing Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991). 
110 Id. at 323. 
111 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000). 
112 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 783. 
Refugee Women as Cultural Others 1007 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
examined.113 Nexus requires a showing of some relationship between the 
feared harm and the Convention ground (for the purposes of this analysis, 
social group), and one of the most demanding tests has been adopted by the 
United States.114 This test requires proof that the persecutor was motivated by a 
Convention ground, meaning that the applicant must show the persecutor’s 
state of mind.115 The REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3) requires that one of the five 
protected grounds “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting 
the applicant.”116 Other nations have not explicitly defined its meaning or 
concede that meaning may differ based upon the context of a particular 
claim.117 
C.  Formulation of Select Gender-Based Claims 
1. FGM-Based Claims 
US courts have a scattered history of jurisprudence for FGM-related asylum 
claims. Although courts generally recognize FGM as persecution, the lack of 
theoretical clarity in recent precedential decisions has lead to inconsistency and 
confusion in constructing such claims.118 Where a personal history shows 
                                                        
113 Laura S. Adams, Fleeing the Family: A Domestic Violence Victim’s Particular Social 
Group, 49 LOY. L. REV. 287, 291 (2003). 
114 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 786. 
115 Sinha, supra note 71, at 1595 n.179 (citing Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 
2000) (“[S]o long as one of the motives for the feared persecutory conduct relates to a 
protected ground, the petitioner is entitled to that status.”)); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 
(9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that applicant “must produce evidence from which it is 
reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied 
protected ground”); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509–10 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[P]ersecutory 
conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is one of the statutorily 
enumerated grounds, the requirements have been satisfied.”). 
116 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 997 (citing INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(I); Matter of 
J-B-N & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2007)). 
117 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 786. See, e.g., id. at 787 
(citing Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept., [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (U.K. House of 
Lords) (1999) (adopting a but-for causation test for the nexus requirement)). See also 
Council of Europe Report, supra note 19. 
118 See, e.g., Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (recognizing the FGM claim 
based on membership in the social group, “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
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individualized risk or intent of a third party to force FGM upon an asylum 
applicant, she should be able to establish “both a subjectively genuine and 
objectively reasonable fear of future [FGM].”119 
In the landmark 1996 case Matter of Kasinga, a nearly unanimous panel of 
BIA judges recognized that the gender-specific practice of FGM is a form of 
persecution, and that gender can constitute a social group in combination with 
other characteristics.120 However, although the Kasinga court arrived at a 
desirable practical result, it did so using an extremely narrow legal 
construction.121 Even though FGM is a gender-specific practice imposed on all 
girls because they are female, the BIA did not find that this persecuted group 
was comprised of the tribe’s female members.122 Instead, the court found that 
Kasinga had a legitimate fear of future persecution because she was a member 
of the particular social group, “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe 
who had not had [FGM], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.”123 Additionally, the BIA found that the practice of FGM was a 
country-wide problem in Togo, yet the nation had done nothing to prevent its 
forced infliction on women.124 The BIA further focused on the fact that the 
applicant had escaped the practice, placing her within a far more restrictive 
                                                                                                                     
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice.”); Hassan v. 
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007); Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 
2005); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th  Cir. 2004); Abankwah v. INS, 185 F.3d 18 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (AG 2008) (reversing BIA finding that the 
presumption of future persecution was rebutted because FGM could not be performed twice 
on the same individual). 
119 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1075. 
120 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1543; LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, 
at 968 (“The former INS detained Kasinga for 16 months despite repeated requests for parole 
pending the disposition of her case. Nine days after a front page New York Times article 
triggered widespread criticism of the INS, the agency released Kasinga from detention.”). 
121 See Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1542. See also Karen Musalo, In re 
Kasinga: A Big Step forward for Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
853 (Jul. 1, 1996). 
122 Randall, supra note 2, at 295. 
123 Id. (quoting Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)). 
124 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1076. 
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social group of women “having intact genitalia” who oppose the imposition of 
FGM.125 Analyzing FGM in its social context, the BIA found that it is a form 
of “sexual oppression” that is “based on a manipulation of women’s sexuality 
in order to assure male dominance and exploitation.”126 Thus, because the tribe 
targeted women who had not suffered FGM in order to subordinate them, the 
BIA found Kasinga’s persecution was “on account of” her membership in a 
“particular social group.”127 
However, Kasinga has since been followed by such cases as Matter of A-T 
and Mohammed v. Gonzales, both of which reflect opposing viewpoints as to 
whether FGM can constitute an ongoing harm.128 In Matter of A-T, the BIA 
faced the question of whether a woman who had already been subjected to 
FGM could still qualify for asylum on that basis.129 Generally, women who 
have already had FGM performed can assert a claim for asylum based on past 
persecution (the infliction of FGM), which entitles them to a presumption of 
having a well-founded fear of future persecution.130 However, in Matter of A-
T, the BIA found that FGM is generally a one-time harm and that women who 
have already been cut ordinarily have no fear for cutting again.131 It “rejected 
the notion that past FGM constitutes ongoing harm to a woman as well as the 
presumption that well-founded fear remains unrebutted by the continuing 
harms of the ritual.”132 Similarly, the BIA rejected Ms. A-T’s forced marriage 
claims, saying that such an arrangement did not rise to the statutory level of 
persecution, and instead required an independent showing of clear probability 
of persecution, which she had failed to make.133 However, the Attorney 
                                                        
125 Randall, supra note 2, at 295. 
126 Donovan, supra note 52, at 325. 
127 Id. 
128 See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005); Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 617 (AG 2008). 
129 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1078. 
130 Id. at 1075. 
131 Id. at 1073. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1078. 
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General reversed the BIA decision, finding that FGM can in fact be performed 
more than once on the same individual.134 Also, despite the fact that some 
cases continue to be granted, the A-T decision has been mistakenly applied to 
women who have already been subjected to FGM.135  
Despite this troubling trend, in the Ninth Circuit case Mohammed v. 
Gonzales, the BIA recognized past FGM as a viable claim to asylum given the 
nature of the past persecution and its ongoing effects.136 It concluded that 
“genital mutilation, like forced sterilization, is a ‘permanent and continuing’ 
act of persecution, which cannot constitute a change in circumstances 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear.”137  The BIA found 
that Ms. Mohammed was targeted for persecution on account of two possible 
social groups: “Somali females” or “young girls of the Benadiri clan.”138 These 
three cases alone indicate the struggle of courts to construe claims of this 
particularized gender-based violence, at the heart of which are 
misconstructions of social group and nexus. 
2.   Sex Trafficking-Based Claims 
Women seeking asylum based on a fear of sex trafficking in their home 
countries are frequently denied sanctuary.139 While there has yet to be any BIA 
or Circuit decision of precedential weight relating to such claims,140 a review 
of existing unpublished decisions indicates a fundamental resistance to 
                                                        
134 Matter of A-T, 24 I. & N.  Dec. 617, 621 (AG 2008). The Attorney General cited 
Mohammed in its analysis and also found that the future harm need not take the same form; 
A-T’s forced marriage claim merited consideration as long as that alleged persecution was 
based on the same social group. Id. at 622. 
135 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1083. 
136 Id. at 1083–84. 
137 See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 800 (9th Cir. 2005). 
138 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1076. 
139 See Knight, supra note 40. In a study done by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies 
at University of California, Hastings, the frequency of grants was found to be 64 percent of 
affirmative sex-trafficking asylum cases at the lowest level, 35 percent at the immigration 
court level, and 25 percent at the BIA. See id. at 5. 
140 See Knight, supra note 40, at 5. In many of the 93 cases studied by CGRS, there was no 
agency decision to review or no written decision to review. See id. 
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acknowledging that even the most severe levels of harm linked to trafficking 
might provide the basis for asylum.141 
Although the vast majority of trafficking victims are targeted because they 
are females, courts neglect to recognize persecution on the basis of gender.142 
Most frequently, IJs and the BIA treat trafficked women as victims of personal, 
criminal problems, thus finding them ineligible for asylum for failure to 
demonstrate a nexus between their forced prostitution and the five categories 
of persecution.143 For example, seventeen-year-old Ann, who was sent to the 
United States on a student exchange program after being kidnapped by a local 
trafficker, beaten, and repeatedly raped, was denied asylum.144 She had heard 
the local trafficker making plans over the phone to traffic her, but was 
eventually able to escape.145 Although she was found to be a credible 
applicant, she was nonetheless denied asylum because the IJ determined that 
“no connection existed between her kidnap, rape, and threatened trafficking 
and any of the asylum grounds.”146 Instead, the IJ referred to her persecutor as 
a “spurned suitor,” and found that his actions “were personal and criminal 
toward the respondent.”147 The IJ’s ruling ignored the overwhelming evidence 
that Ann’s treatment by her persecutor was very similar to the way in which 
young women are forced into trafficking.148 Specifically, “traffickers are 
documented to have used offers of marriage to recruit women for the sex trade 
and for forced labor,” just as Ann’s trafficker had repeatedly approached her 
on the street with marriage proposals.149 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial in a 
mere few sentences, noting, “the respondent has failed to carry her burden of 
                                                        
141 Id. 
142 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 454. 





148 Id. (“The Department of Justice’s ‘Introduction to Human Trafficking’ repeatedly makes 
reference to the use of ‘sham’ and ‘false’ marriages.”). 
149 Id. 
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proof ….that she should be persecuted on a protected ground to include [sic] 
her political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”150 
Other cases similarly illustrate courts’ refusal to include victims of sex 
trafficking as a cognizable social group, which precludes a finding of a nexus 
between the gender-related group and persecution. Courts have held that 
defining a group solely by the group’s persecution entails impermissible, 
circular reasoning.151 For example, one case involved a Thai woman who was 
smuggled into the United States and forced into prostitution in a number of 
cities.152 Entrusted to deliver a few hundred dollars to her captors, she bought a 
plane ticket and was able to escape, but her mother had since received threats 
in Thailand regarding an outstanding debt related to her trafficking.153 The BIA 
rejected her proposed social group of “sex slaves from foreign countries who 
are brought to the [United States] under false pretenses and forced at the threat 
of death and destruction to participate in sexual activities” by stating that the 
persons who were in contact with her family, “seemed more interested in 
having the debt repaid than in finding the respondent herself.”154 
Similarly, in the case of Sophie, a young Russian woman who was held in 
captivity and repeatedly gang-raped, the IJ denied asylum based on her 
proposed social group that included women of her country, “forced into 
prostitution by the mafia who escape from sexual bondage.”155 The fact that 
the IJ granted Sophie relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
                                                        
150 Id. at 7. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s finding that Ann was also barred from asylum 
based on the one-year filing deadline even though she arrived as an unaccompanied minor at 
the age of sixteen and was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  The IJ 
further noted that she could have “easily . . . rectified” her feelings of shame and humiliation 
“by going to an attorney.” Id. 
151 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 466. Instead, trafficking victims must construct a narrower 
category based on a distinctive quality that unites them such as being single, attractive, 
educated, or orphaned as a child. Still, these cases are not guaranteed to be successful. Id. 
152 Knight, supra note 40, at 7 (citing CGRS Case # 3695). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 9. The IJ relied on the BIA’s recent decision of Matter of R-A in the construction of 
social group. 
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implies that the primary issues had been those of social group and nexus, 
which are not required under CAT.156 Additionally, in the small number of 
cases resulting in positive grants of asylum, courts are reluctant to recognize 
social groups constructed in principal part by gender, and rather focus on 
forced prostitution and international trafficking.157 
3.  Domestic Violence-Based Claims 
Survivors of domestic violence who seek asylum repeatedly encounter 
courts that refuse to recognize either a cognizable social group or a nexus 
between the alleged ground of abuse and the persecution. Even when courts 
have sparingly recognized the existence of a social group, they have not 
acknowledged that the women were targeted on this basis, but rather often 
have imputed other grounds for asylum in lieu of finding a gender-based 
group.158 
In Matter of R-A, one of the most recent and influential BIA decisions on 
this issue, asylum was originally denied to Rodi Alvarado, a Guatemalan 
woman fleeing an abusive domestic relationship, because she failed to show 
that she was a member of a particular social group.159 Ms. Alvarado had been 
                                                        
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 12–13 nn. 138, 142, 146 (citing Matter of Anon, A79-607-478 (Oakdale, LA, 
Immigration Court, Dec. 20, 2005) at 4; Matter of S-A, A# redacted (Chicago, IL, 
Immigration Court, Jun. 18, 2001); Matter of F-L, A# redacted (Anchorage, AK, 
Immigration Court, Jul. 24, 1998)). 
158 See Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999) (vacated for review of “social group” 
analysis, and finding that there was no nexus based on an imputed political opinion claim 
that the applicant was harmed due to her resistance to overcome male domination); Lazo-
Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting asylum to applicant subjected to 
beatings and rapes based on a cynically imputed political opinion); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying asylum to an Iranian woman because the government-
mandated practice of wearing a chador was not so abhorrent to her so as to constitute 
persecution, but recognizing that women constitute a social group). 
159 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1533. On December 10, 2009, Rodi Alvarado 
was finally granted asylum, ending her fourteen year-long legal battle. See Domestic 
Violence Victim Granted Asylum in the US, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 18, 2009, available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/photos%20-
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the victim of extreme spousal violence for over ten years.160 Her husband, a 
former soldier, “broke windows and mirrors with her head, whipped her with 
electrical cords, pistol-whipped her, raped and sodomized her, and kicked her 
in the genitalia, causing severe bleeding.”161 Her efforts to seek protection 
from the police were fruitless.162 Despite her requests for help, authorities 
refused to be involved, and the judge who handled her complaints informed 
her that he “would not interfere in domestic disputes.”163 The BIA found that 
her proposed social group was not satisfactory because its members were not 
“recognized and understood to be a societal faction.”164 
Also, the BIA determined that “the husband/persecutor’s motivation was 
unrelated to Ms. Alvarado’s membership in the designated social group.”165 
The BIA found that “although her husband might have beaten her because of 
his own views on men and women, the evidence did not show that he beat her 
because of what she believed.”166 Furthermore, the BIA indicated that Ms. 
Alvarado had to make an additional showing that people in Guatemala 
perceived the existence of her particular group and that women were expected 
by society to be abused.167 In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) filed a brief to then-Attorney General (AG) John Ashcroft arguing that 




160 Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in the US, supra note 159. 




165 Id. at 803. 
166 Donovan, supra note 52, at 317. 
167 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (quoting Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
918, 919) (BIA 1999). 
168 Lisa Frydman, Key US cases relating to women asylum seekers, Women’s Asylum News 
(Asylum Aid, London, U.K.), Sept. 2009, at 1, 2, available at  
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/LF,%20Key%20Cases%20Relating%20to%20Women,%20
Women’s%20Asylum%20News,%2009-2009.pdf. 
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to the BIA in 2008 after vacating the decision,169 Matter of R-A has been cited 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys and IJs alike to 
deny other gender-based claims of asylum for forced prostitution, gang rape, 
and honor killing.170 In his order for remand, the AG imposed the additional 
requirements that had developed in asylum jurisprudence: social visibility and 
particularity.171 Moreover, despite the filing of its 2004 brief, DHS has 
repeatedly opposed asylum grants based upon domestic violence. Still, under 
the Obama administration in 2009, DHS filed another brief conceding that 
women who have suffered domestic violence may be able to establish 
eligibility for asylum.172 
While the trend of US jurisprudence appears to weigh against them, 
survivors of domestic violence may find hope in the Ninth Circuit’s 2010 
decision, Perdomo v. Holder.173 Although asylum was denied by both the IJ 
and BIA, the Ninth Circuit chose to remand to the immigration court the case 
of another Guatemalan woman seeking asylum, Ms. Lesly Perdomo, in order 
to determine (1) whether “Guatemalan women” could constitute a particular 
social group and (2) whether the applicant had demonstrated a fear of 
                                                        
169 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (“Attorney General Janet Reno vacated 
the Board’s decision in R.A., and ordered the Board to reconsider the case in light of the then 
pending asylum regulations . . . Attorney General John Ashcroft ‘recertified’ the case to 
himself for a decision. . . . Finally, in 2008, Michael Mukasey became the third attorney 
general to certify the case to himself. He too remanded the case to the BIA.”). 
170 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1535. 
171 Frydman, supra note 168, at 3 (“The BIA has tried to justify these requirements by saying 
that they are consistent with UNHCR guidelines on social group claims. However, UNHCR 
has repeatedly stated that this is not correct.”). 
172 Frydman, supra note 168, at 3 (referencing Brief of Dep’t of Homeland Security, Matter 
of L-R- (BIA Apr. 2009) (redacted), available at  
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf. In that case, 
Ms. L.R. was tormented by her common law husband, who raped and battered her for nearly 
two decades. Her attempts to seek protection from the police went unheeded. Her asylum 
claim was denied by an IJ in 2007, and DHS initially filed a brief supporting the IJ’s position 
in 2008. It changed course under the Obama administration in 2009. Musalo, A Short History 
of Gender Asylum, supra note 70, at 60. 
173 Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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persecution.174 The social group prescribed by the applicant was “all women in 
Guatemala.”175 Ms. Perdomo alleged that her fear was based on the high 
incidence of murder of women in Guatemala as well as the nonresponsiveness 
of the government in addressing such atrocities.176 The Ninth Circuit found 
that the IJ and BIA had erred in finding that this description could not 
constitute a social group.177 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that it 
had previously recognized that women, or young girls, of a particular clan 
could constitute a particular social group.178 It also referenced the INS (now 
United States Citizenship and Naturalization Services, or USCIS) Guidelines, 
as well as other international authorities that recognize that the “common 
characteristic of sex” may constitute a particular social group “under certain 
circumstances.”179 Furthermore, the court rejected the BIA’s finding that “all 
women in Guatemala” is “overly broad and internally diverse,” and instead 
concluded “size and breadth alone does not preclude a group from qualifying 
as such a group.”180 
                                                        
174 Id. at 669. 
175 Id. at 665. 
176 Id. at 664. 
177 Id. at 669. 
178 Id. at 667 (citing Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
179 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at n.5 (“One of our sister circuits has recognized gender as the basis 
for a particular social group. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993). We also note that 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have recognized gender as the basis for a 
particular social group.”). 
180 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668. The court also noted that it has rejected groups as overly broad 
only where “there is no unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow the diverse and 
disconnected group.” (citing Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F. 3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
Another recent IJ asylum grant to a Honduran woman in January 2011 indicates an 
encouraging trend towards more widespread recognition of domestic violence-based claims. 
See Matter of Anon, A# redacted (San Antonio, TX Immigration Court, Jan. 19, 2011) (on 
file with author). In its decision, that court rightly considered social and cultural factors 
without imputing notions of Otherness: “Respondent indicates that women in Honduras are 
widely seen as less deserving of basic human rights than men, that domestic violence is 
common and largely accepted by society, and that the Honduran government has made little 
effort to rectify this problem.” Id. at 14. 
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Thus, even a cursory glance at US asylum case law related to gender-based 
claims indicates that courts are lacking in legal constructions to consistently 
address the particular nature of the persecution suffered by refugee women 
subjected to FGM, sex trafficking, and domestic violence. 
V.  PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION OF US ASYLUM JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  The Invisible of Nicaragua 
The air was thick with humidity as our jeep pulled to an abrupt stop on the 
ditch-ridden dirt road. Curious faces appeared from the darkened interiors of 
nearby tin-roofed homes, and we smiled, greeting them in Spanish. The church 
across the street stood proudly amidst other thinly constructed buildings on the 
one street that composed almost the entirety of this Nicaraguan pueblo. A 
meeting with a handful of local community members was to take place inside 
the church. Our small delegation was a part of an initiative to establish 
mediation centers in rural communities to provide campesinos181 with access 
to the far-removed features of their justice system. 
Inside the church, we set plastic cups, soda, and crackers for the people who 
wandered in, taking their seats to begin the meeting. Eventually, a group of 
about ten men and four women gathered, and the mediators began the meeting 
with a series of icebreakers and introductions. Then, the mediators assigned to 
community members the task of drawing a haphazard map—with markers and 
construction paper—of their pueblo, identifying all “conflict zones.” Over the 
course of the next two hours, the mediators lead a discussion of various 
problems facing the community—pigs crossing onto neighbors’ property, 
armed soldiers stationed arbitrarily inside the town, drunken debauchery 
outside the local bars. 
                                                        
181 Country-people. See translation at Wordreference.com,  
http://www.wordreference.com/es/en/translation.asp?spen=campesino (last visited Feb. 11, 
2012). 
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As the conversation appeared to be nearing a close, one of the mediators 
asked the group, “And what about intra-familial violence?” The initial 
response to this question was met with silence. “Is it a problem?” he persisted. 
I noticed that the four women sitting at the edge of the congregation were 
nodding while the men muttered to one another. Finally, one of the men spoke 
up, “Well, you see—it is normal, it is just the way things are. It is not really the 
business of another man, how he treats his wife.” There was a grumble of 
approval amongst the other men. 
Later, as I watched rolling, green mountains sweep by my window on our 
ride out from the countryside, I asked one of the Nicaraguan mediators if the 
response we heard with regards to domestic violence was one she saw in many 
other communities. Heavily, she told me that, unfortunately, it was—and that 
even when a woman wanted to try to resolve a domestic dispute through 
mediation, it nearly always ended badly, with further beatings from her 
husband at home. It is so ingrained in the culture, she explained. There were 
efforts to build shelters in some of the less remote towns for women fleeing 
domestic violence, but they were very few and did not have many resources. I 
was struck by the helplessness of the whole situation—of women unable to save 
themselves from lives of violence, of a government equally as helpless. 
B. New Legal Theories for Gender-Based Claims 
US asylum law does not recognize the complexity of social pressures that 
create such situations. Instead, courts have constructed refugee women as 
cultural Others in their evaluation of gender-based asylum claims, thereby 
allowing for relativist rationalizations of global female persecution.182 This 
                                                        
182 Sinha, supra note 71, at 1578 (“It seems as though the successful asylum-seeker must cast 
herself as a cultural Other, that is, someone fleeing from a more primitive culture.”)  (quoting 
SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE 
IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 92 (1998)); Sinha, supra note 71, at 1580 (“By fighting 
‘sexism with racism,’ colonialist feminism defined its mission as saving their Third World 
Sisters from their uncivilized cultures” (quoting RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE 
EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 113)). 
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construct must be overcome so that new legal theories of social group and 
nexus that better incorporate gender sensitivities can be accepted. A separate 
Convention ground of “gender,” which incorporates gender sensitivities into 
asylum law’s persecution requirement, is favorable because it allows for a 
more comprehensive restructuring of judicial viewpoints on gender-based 
claims. 
To illustrate that this remedial theory can be applied to a variety of gender-
based claims throughout the world, this section’s analysis will continue to 
focus on the three types of persecution that have been previously discussed 
(FGM, sex trafficking, and domestic violence), but it will include geographical 
diversity in the analysis of such claims so as to emphasize the universality of 
fundamental human rights.  
First, courts should construe “social group” to include common past 
experience, avoid imputing gender-related persecution to other asylum 
grounds, and place less emphasis on social visibility. Second, courts should 
formulate “nexus” using a modified bifurcated approach that better 
incorporates the cultural meaning of the private sphere and places less 
emphasis on the intent of the persecutor. In addition, these jurisprudential 
modifications can only be realized if asylum procedure provides a safe and 
practical environment for refugee women to fully develop gender-sensitive 
claims. Last, this section will address the primary concern by skeptics of 
gender-based claims—that to liberalize jurisprudential standards in this area 
would “open the floodgates” to an excessive number of female asylum-seekers. 
C.  Gender as a Separate Ground 
Some legal scholars have argued that the best solution to judicial 
misconstructions of gender-based asylum claims would be to simply add the 
category of “gender” to the existing five grounds for which a refugee might be 
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persecuted.183 Yet, for several reasons this is an insufficient remedy. While 
adding “gender” as a Convention ground may signal to asylum adjudicators 
that this group merits special consideration, this addition does not remedy the 
substantive confusion that continues to exist with gender-based claims. 
Generally, the malleability of the “social group” category would better serve 
gender-based claims because it allows a broader framework with which to 
conceive gender persecution. Judges who might be reluctant to recognize 
persecution based strictly on a separate “gender” ground may be more 
persuaded by developed legal principles, though still gender-related. For 
example, the court in Kasinga, which constructed a very narrow social group 
for which Kasinga was persecuted, may not have been persuaded that she was 
sought out for maltreatment for being a woman but rather on that very specific 
basis.184 Gender combined with social group allows for that analysis, which 
may be more persuasive to certain judges or adjudicators, whose discretion is 
especially determinative in asylum claim outcomes.185 
Similarly, solely providing a separate ground would not necessarily alleviate 
judicial confusion surrounding the notion that “women being persecuted as 
women” is not the same as “women being persecuted because they are 
women.”186 In the context of civil war, for example, rape may be used as a 
means of persecuting a woman on account of her membership in an opposing 
political party or ethnic minority.187 By contrast, a public flogging may be used 
                                                        
183 See Randall, supra note 2, at 302 (citing Mattie Stevens, Recognizing Gender-Specific 
Persecution: A Proposal to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 179 (1993)).  
184 The court constructed Kasinga’s social group to be, “young women of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the 
practice.” Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA Jun. 13, 1996). 
185 See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 1039 (referencing Ramji-Nogales, supra 
note 101) (“A massive, recently completed empirical study also confirms what practitioners 
have long recognized as a serious problem—sharp disparities in the asylum approval rates 
from one adjudicator to another.”). 
186 Randall, supra note 2, at 303 (citing Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the 
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213, 259 (1995)). 
187 Id. 
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to punish a woman for refusing to conform to oppressive religious practices.188 
If a judge were to construe the former scenario of rape as gender-directed 
persecution, such a construction might limit the woman’s asylum claim if other 
evidence in the record does not show that she was targeted due to her identity 
as a woman. Such a scenario would demand an analysis based on political 
opinion or race as opposed to gender. Yet, in the absence of substantive 
constructions surrounding the terms “gender” and “social group,” judges 
would still be left without the proper legal tools to formulate claims that 
incorporate gender nuances. The potential expansiveness of the “social group” 
category allows it to accommodate claims of women belonging to a number of 
different social subsets.189 Thus, adding “gender” as a separate ground for 
persecution does not easily solve problems within American asylum law. In 
addition to that added ground, it is necessary to create better formulated 
constructions of “social group” and “nexus” to more effectively address the 
complex needs of refugee women. 
D.  Formulations of Social Group 
1. Common Past Experience 
Courts should consider refugee women who have had a common past 
experience of persecution to be members of a particular social group. The 
social and psychological implications of having undergone violence and 
subordination are unifying factors central to their identities as women. The 
identifying feature of having had the experience itself is paired with sexual 
identity, a quality already recognized by courts as an immutable 
characteristic.190 
Instead of construing claims of FGM to include common past experience, 
courts—such as that of Matter of A-T—downplay the significant violence of 
                                                        
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 302. 
190 Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F. 3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F. 3d 1233 
(3d Cir. 1993)). 
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the practice. They rationalize that because the practice had already been 
performed, there is no fear of future persecution.191 This reasoning ignores the 
societal role of FGM that was recognized in Matter of Kasinga, which 
characterized the practice as a “form of sexual oppression” that is “based on 
the manipulation of women’s sexuality in order to assure male dominance and 
exploitation.”192 By evading this social function of the practice, courts equate 
FGM to an act of violence such as the removal of a limb and refuse to 
acknowledge that it is a mere symptom of a greater malignancy. To do so 
places refugee victims of FGM in a culturally neutral sphere outside the 
comprehension of male-reasoned legal theories. 
Placing greater emphasis on—or at least recognizing the significance of—
the effect on a woman’s life from a past FGM experience would allow courts 
to face the deeper, more widespread reality of female subordination. The court 
in Mohammed v. Gonzales exemplifies the product of such reasoning. In that 
case, the Ninth Circuit employed a variation of this emphasis on past 
experience when it characterized FGM as a “permanent and continuing” act of 
persecution.193 The court was able to reach this conclusion only by considering 
the deep social and psychological implications of the practice, stating that “the 
extremely painful, physically invasive, psychologically damaging, and 
permanently disfiguring process of genital mutilation undoubtedly rises to the 
level of persecution.”194 By recognizing Ms. Mohammed’s possible social 
group membership as one of “Somalian females” or “young girls in the 
Bendari clan,” the court implicitly defined her group by common past 
experience. In defining these two groups, the court noted that “genital 
mutilation is not clan-specific, but rather is deeply imbedded in the culture 
throughout the nation and performed on approximately 98 percent of females,” 
                                                        
191 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1073. 
192 Donovan, supra note 52, at 325 (quoting In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, at 3). 
193 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1076. 
194 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F. 3d 785, 796 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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thereby constructing those two groups on the basis of the common past 
experience of FGM.195 
Both sex trafficking and domestic violence-based asylum claims have 
encountered resistance from courts on the basis that circular reasoning 
precludes recognition of that particular social group. In other words, courts 
have reasoned that a group cannot be defined by the fact that it suffers 
persecution.196 This rationale is flawed because the unifying past experience of 
persecution is only one factor in defining that social group; the persecution was 
inflicted in the first place because of the immutable characteristic of being a 
woman, as recognized by the Mohammed court.197 The woman has additional, 
unchanging, psychological, and social characteristics as a result of her being a 
victim of that persecution.198 
In the case of sex trafficking claims, former victims may be considered a 
social group based on their common characteristic of having been trafficked. 
On account of shared past experience, they could face differing types of 
persecution such as ostracism, punishment, reprisals, or re-trafficking.199 Such 
reasoning could have been applied to the case of Sophie, introduced above,200 
                                                        
195 Id. at 796. 
196 Knight, supra note 40, at 10. 
197 Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 798 (“Moreover, there is little question that genital mutilation 
occurs to a particular individual because she is a female.”). 
198 In one study of asylum-seekers seeking mental health services, instances of PTSD and 
depressive disorders occurred in frequencies of 82 and 96 percent, respectively. Survivors of 
trauma experience symptoms such as flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, nightmares, and 
dissociation from normal emotional responses. They may also experience memory problems, 
which can lead to unintentional omissions of particularly traumatic facts when attempting to 
tell their stories in a courtroom setting. Lustig, supra note 95, at 726. 
199 Knight, supra note 40, at 4 (referencing U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on 
International Protection: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at 
Risk of Being Trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07 P39 (Apr. 7, 2006)). See also Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003) (granting refugee status to a former child 
soldier who had “shared past experience of abduction, torture, and escape with other former 
child soldiers.”). 
200 Knight, supra note 40, at 8 (citing Matter of Anon, A# redacted (Seattle, WA Immigration 
Court, Feb. 7, 2000) at 5). 
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in which the IJ refused to recognize her proposed group: women from her 
country, “forced into prostitution by the mafia who escape bondage.”201 Even 
though the judge accepted as true all of the facts of her case, including 
Sophie’s assertion that “she would either be abducted again and again 
subjected to prostitution, . . . or, more likely, be targeted for ritualized 
execution,” the IJ failed to see Sophie’s past experience of being trafficked as 
an immutably defining characteristic.202 
In another rare case, Matter of F-L,203 where asylum was granted to a 
Honduran trafficking victim, the court skirted the notion of gender but 
implicitly recognized common past experience in its analysis.204 After being 
beaten unconscious while at work one day, Laura was held captive in a brothel, 
where she was forced to have sex with police officers and soldiers, among 
others. When she was finally able to escape to the United States, Laura 
appealed her denial of asylum by the IJ on the basis of a social group 
composed of gender, plus nationality, age, and inability to escape forced 
prostitution.205 Yet, instead of recognizing this group, the BIA constructed its 
own, composed of “children who have been abandoned by their parents and 
who have not received surrogate protection,” noting that Laura’s “extreme 
vulnerability” was a critical characteristic.206 Though this reasoning is blatantly 
problematic because it completely excludes gender from the social group 
construction, it does recognize the vulnerability of victims such as Laura by 
virtue of their common experience of being trafficked. This case law thus 
                                                        
201 Id. at 9. 
202 Id. (Notably, the IJ relied on the then-recent opinion in Matter of R-A, finding that 
Sophie’s proposed social group “failed to pass muster under the Board’s analysis under 
Matter of R-A.”). 
203 Knight, supra note 40 n.146 (citing Matter of Anon, A# redacted (Anchorage, AK, 
Immigration Court, Jul. 24, 1998)). 
204 Id. at 14. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
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supports non-consensual, common past experiences as valid social group 
characteristics.207 
Victims of domestic violence similarly share a past experience of 
persecution coupled with gender identity. In Matter of R-A, Rodi Alvarado’s 
experience of mental and physical abuse at the hands of her husband was 
unique—and immutable—to her position as a woman in Guatemalan society. 
Yet, the court held that the Acosta immutability test was “merely a necessary 
but not sufficient condition to the construction of that group.”208 Instead, it 
found that Ms. Alvarado had failed to show a “voluntary associational 
relationship” among group members.209 Yet, it is noteworthy that Perdomo v. 
Holder recognized the significance of a common past experience of abuse 
when it invoked the two-prong test under Hernandez-Montiel.210 This test 
permits consideration of “an innate characteristic [,which] is so fundamental to 
the identities or consciences that its members either cannot or should not be 
required to change it,” as an alternative to the “voluntary associational” 
requirement.211 Finding that the BIA had failed to apply this second prong (just 
as the BIA had failed to do in the pre-Hernandez-Montiel case, Matter of R-A), 
the Perdomo court remanded for determination of whether “Guatemalan 
women” could constitute a social group.212 Arguably, the common experience 
of being victimized women of that society should constitute sufficient innate 
characteristics for this latter prong of analysis. 
By emphasizing this theory of circular reasoning, courts alienate refugee 
women by characterizing their experiences of persecution as isolated incidents 
that have no impact on their social or psychological well being. To recognize 
                                                        
207 Id. at 11. 
208 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975. 
209 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 975 (quoting Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. at 
917–18) (BIA 1999). 
210 Hernandez–Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000) followed the BIA’s holding in 
Matter of R-A. 
211 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d, at 1093. 
212 Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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common past experience as an immutable factor in gender-based claims offers 
protection against the intricacies of female subordination. 
2. Imputing “Gender” to Other Asylum Grounds 
In constructing gender-based asylum claims, courts have often completely 
skirted the issue of “social group” by imputing gender issues to other grounds 
for asylum, most commonly political opinion and religion.213 This strategy is 
problematic because it further clouds judicial understanding of gender issues 
by attempting to fit them into rigid, male-oriented categories. Although some 
individual women have succeeded on their asylum claims for these separate 
grounds, fitting gender claims into categories where they do not belong merely 
perpetuates a fundamental problem of immigration courts: their failure to 
recognize gender-specific persecution.214 
Among FGM claims, courts have construed gender-based claims in ways 
that impute political opinion, even if that is not the ground on which asylum is 
being sought. Underscoring the language of Kasinga, which in fact recognized 
a gender-based claim, is also an implied ground of political opinion.215 The 
court considered the fact that Kasinga did “not wish to be subjected to FGM,” 
thus implying that it was her belief—and not her identity as a victimized 
woman—that was relevant for formulating her claim.216 This mistaken 
construction also affects the way that courts construe nexus, because where 
they fail to examine the proper gender-based social group, courts cannot 
acknowledge persecution “on account of” gender.217 This focus on macro-level 
difficulties of an individual’s resistance to oppressive gender practices neglects 
                                                        
213 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F. 3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); Matter of R-A, 22. I. & N. Dec. 906 
(BIA 1999); Matter of D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77 (BIA 1993); Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. 357 (BIA 1996); Matter of S-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999). 
214 Randall, supra note 2, at 298. 
215 Donovan, supra note 52, at 324 (citing Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA 
1996) (recognizing social group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who 
have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, performed, and who oppose the practice.”). 
216 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 367 (BIA 1996). 
217 Donovan, supra note 52, at 324. 
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gender as the basis of the particular social group. Furthermore, to suggest that 
a woman’s belief that she should be free from beatings and violence is a 
“political belief” is inappropriate—it implies that a woman’s entitlement to be 
treated as a human being is just a particularized opinion, not a fundamental 
right.218 That reasoning relegates refugee women to a distant, non-universal 
sphere of individual human rights.219 
Victims of sex trafficking have likewise employed this tactic of claiming 
asylum based on an imputed gender-based political opinion or religious 
inference. This conceptual separation—between political opinion and 
victimization based on sex trafficking—allowed for an unfavorable result in 
the case of Ann, who was denied on both of these grounds.220 Ann had been 
approached by her trafficker several times on the street with requests that she 
marry him, and at one point he yelled at her mother, making a threat in 
reference to her membership in the Democratic Party in Albania.221 Yet, the IJ 
did not find a connection between her persecution and any of the Convention 
grounds (she had argued on the basis of political opinion and a gender-defined 
social group).222 Not only was Ann’s claim dismissed as one of personal, 
criminal intent, but it may be inferred that the IJ’s nexus analysis was further 
clouded by the political opinion claim—for which there was no clear 
connection.223 Thus, the trend of imputing political opinion to claims of 
gender-based persecution adds to the confusion of adjudicators in identifying 
the underlying motivation for such persecution. 
                                                        
218 Randall, supra note 2, at 298 (“Consider that it would be odd to argue that South African 
whites oppressed blacks because blacks held the opinion that they were entitled to be treated 
as human beings (though they presumably did hold that belief). Indeed, apartheid existed 
because of the racist beliefs of whites—in other words, blacks were persecuted because of 
their racialized identity, not because of what they believed.”). 
219 See generally Sinha, supra note 71, at 1578 (noting that concepts of cultural Otherness 
may inform asylum decision-making); MILLER, supra note 61, at 189 (describing 
progression in the last several decades of recognition of international human rights). 




1028   SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
Similarly, courts impute political opinion and religious beliefs to asylum 
claims based on domestic violence, thereby further convoluting theories of 
gender-persecution. For example, in Matter of R-A, Ms. Alvarado argued in 
part on the basis of imputed political opinion, claiming that her husband was 
harming her in order to overcome her resistance to his male domination.224 
Yet, the court rejected this argument, stating that there was no evidence that 
her husband cared what her political opinions were.225 Thus, by attempting to 
adapt the male-oriented ground of political opinion to Ms. Alvarado’s gender-
specific manifestation of persecution, the court lost sight of the most 
significant, gendered aspects of her claim.226 
In another domestic violence-related claim, Matter of S-A,227 the BIA 
completely avoided the social group category and granted asylum based on 
religion, saying that “the record clearly establishes that because of his orthodox 
Muslim beliefs regarding women and his daughter’s refusal to submit to such 
religiously-inspired demands, the respondent’s father treated her differently 
from her brothers, her male counter parts.”228 In that case, a Moroccan woman 
sought asylum due to the extreme and escalating abuse of her father.229 Her 
father had burned her legs with a hot razor for wearing a skirt that was too 
short, did not let her stay in school past the third grade, and permanently 
                                                        
224 LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 3, at 924. 
225 The BIA also had to distinguish Matter of R-A from the previous Ninth Circuit case, 
Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987), which treated the persecutor as seeking 
to overcome the applicant’s actual political opinion that men should not be permitted to 
dominate women. However, the BIA held that Lazo-Majano only stood for the “proposition 
that cynically imputed political opinion can suffice.” LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 
3, at 924.  
226 However, imputing a political opinion ground has also been used by courts to grant 
asylum claims. For example, in a 2001 case in New York, the court granted asylum based on 
a social group of “women in Guatemalan society who resist male domination by living 
independently and self-sufficiently.” Matter of Octavia, A# redacted (New York, NY, 
Immigration Court, Mar. 10, 2001), 18, 20 (on file with author). 
227 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (BIA 2000). 
228 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1534 (citing Matter of S-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
1328 (BIA 2000). 
229 Id. 
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confined her to the house after she spoke to a man asking for directions.230 The 
court characterized the actions of her father as “ultra orthodox Muslim views” 
that conflicted with her “liberal Muslim views.”231 Again, the court chose to 
evade constructions of gender persecution in favor of using a gender-neutral 
“religion” analysis. In another domestic violence-based case, DHS negated the 
applicant’s assertion that she was persecuted based on her “feminist” political 
opinion.232 DHS argued that “harm is not on account of political opinion when 
it is inflicted regardless of the victim’s opinion rather than because of that 
opinion.”233 Imputing gender in this instance would not provide a court with 
the proper tools to recognize such a claim. 
In all of these situations, courts’ attempts to fit gender issues into pre-
constructed, male-oriented categories of asylum circumvent the fundamental 
problem of raising gender as a surface issue. While courts should factor gender 
into their evaluation of existing asylum grounds where appropriate, they 
should not go out of their way to misconstrue gender-based issues. Instead, 
they should name it for what it is: gender-based persecution. This can only be 
done by incorporating cultural context into “social group” constructions so as 




232 Brief of Dep’t of Homeland Security, Matter of Alvarado (Apr. 2009) at 22, available at 
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%20on%20PSG.pdf  [hereinafter 
Alvarado DHS Brief]. 
233 Id.  
234 The IJ grant of asylum in January 2011 gave significant deference to the societal and 
cultural context of female subordination: “The prevalence of violence against women has 
caused some scholars to apply the term ‘femicide’ to murders of women in the country. In 
Honduras, ‘the murder of women is set in a culture of impunity supported by gender 
stereotypes that blame and stigmatize victims . . . as jealous, mad, or libertine.’ It thus found 
that the asylum applicant had ‘proven that abused women in male-dominated intimate 
relationships often face domestic violence in Honduras and that women who face domestic 
violence are known and socially visible to society.’” See Matter of Anon, A# redacted (San 
Antonio, TX Immigration Court, Jan. 19, 2011) (on file with author). 
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3. Social Visibility 
Women seeking asylum based on FGM, sex trafficking, or domestic 
violence frequently encounter judicial biases that employ “visibility” criteria 
that preclude formation of a social group.235 The BIA’s 2006 decision in 
Matter of C-A explicitly set forth this “visibility” criteria in order to establish a 
cognizable social group, even though such criteria contravenes UNHCR’s 
guidance.236 Requiring “visibility” in order to define a persecuted group seems 
counter-intuitive because, in all likelihood, that very persecution has caused 
the group to be socially invisible. To require politically voiceless and 
disenfranchised groups to show recognition by the same forces that may be 
subjecting them to persecution is impractical. This is especially true in the 
realm of gender-based persecution, as women are often relegated to the private 
sphere of the home, where their suffering cannot be viewed by society at 
large.237 Placing emphasis on “visibility” as a factor alienates refugee women 
because to do so presumes that they have a role in the public sphere, although 
in many cultures, this often remains a strictly male-accessible arena. 
Numerous examples illustrate the implications of this flawed reasoning. For 
example, in Matter of A-C, a young Mexican girl was frequently beaten by her 
father—such beatings included weekly whippings—because of her attempts to 
protect her mother.238 Though the IJ found a viable social group of “Mexican 
children subjected to domestic violence,” the BIA reversed, stating that she 
had not shown that the group was recognized and determined to be a societal 
                                                        
235 See, e.g., Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of S-E-G, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Santos-Lemus v. Mukaskey, 542 F. 3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008). 
236 Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum, supra note 69, at 61. In a recent amicus brief, 
the UNHCR made an important distinction between social visibility and social perception. 
The latter is more appropriate because it does not require that the “common attribute be 
visible to the naked eye.” Id. (citing Brief of the UNHCR as Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Petitioner, Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 14 Apr. 2009, available at  
http:/unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49ef25102.html). 
237 Randall, supra note 2, at 284. See also Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (calling into question the 
appropriateness of the social visibility test). 
238 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1536. 
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faction in Mexico.239 The court in Matter of R-A employed similar reasoning 
when it distinguished Ms. Alvarado’s case from FGM in the following ways: 
(1) the evidence did not show that “domestic violence is . . . [a] socially 
important practice,” (2) failure to commit or suffer domestic violence “does 
not cause social ostracism—non-abusive husbands and non-abused wives are 
not socially ostracized because they are not abusive or abused,” and (3) Rodi 
Alvarado did not show that “domestic violence was so pervasive that 
Guatemalan society targets women who have not been abused.”240 
The fact that the court distinguished these “visibility” factors from an FGM 
claim, where presumably such visibility does exist, demonstrates the way that 
courts have placed undue emphasis on social consciousness of a given group. 
Matter of Kasinga emphasized a public display of resistance to the practice of 
FGM and downplayed Kasinga’s identity as a woman. By formulating the 
claim in this male-oriented way, that court created a model of social visibility 
for future courts to follow, allowing them to ignore the essence of Kasinga’s 
actual claim to persecution as a woman. Thus, in Matter of R-A, the court 
failed to see that the lack of social visibility is in fact a symptom of deeply 
pervasive persecution—and that unlike FGM, punishment for non-compliance 
with the “practice” of domestic violence was one and the same. In another 
case, DHS argued that based upon the principles of social visibility, a domestic 
violence victim and asylum applicant had failed to establish that “there exists 
in Mexican society a sufficient consensus as to what constitutes an ‘abusive’ 
domestic relationship, a term which is subjective and thus amorphous.”241 
As in the cases of victims of FGM and domestic violence, factors that would 
distinguish women as targets for sex trafficking are connected to their 
vulnerability—and, therefore, lack of visibility in certain social settings. 
Examples of “invisible” social subsets that are likely to be targeted for sex 
                                                        
239 Id. 
240 Donovan, supra note 52, at 326. 
241 Supplemental Brief, Board of Immigration Appeals (Dep’t of Homeland Security Apr. 13, 
2009) (in removal proceedings) (on file with author). 
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trafficking include “single women, widows, divorced women, illiterate women, 
separated or unaccompanied children, orphans, or street children.”242 Thus, 
using the visibility requirement from Matter of Kasinga and Matter of R-A, 
courts could easily misconstrue “social group” to preclude such 
disenfranchised populations from forming a claim.243 For example, a court 
could reason that illiterate women would not be ostracized or abused because 
they oppose sex trafficking. Yet, this reasoning does not account for the reality 
that women are not exploited for sex trafficking because they oppose it, but 
rather because of their disadvantaged and unseen social status as women. 
Furthermore, where visibility is attached as a requirement, societal 
misconstructions about the role of consent in cases of forced prostitution or 
trafficking are likely to be given undue weight. Though it can hardly be argued 
that women of disadvantaged social status would have chosen a life of 
prostitution for themselves, it is possible that such assumptions can easily 
infiltrate considerations of sex trafficking claims.244 
By eradicating a requirement for “social visibility” from social group, courts 
will be better able to identify persecution on the basis of gender, which is often 
hidden from the public eye. Moreover, it will place the United States in 
alliance with international human rights instruments.245 This strategy will 
avoid alienation of refugee women because it does not downplay their roles in 
the private sphere, but rather acknowledges that persecution manifests itself 
ways that are often invisible to the public eye.        
                                                        
242 Knight, supra note 40, at 4. 
243 In fact, the court in Matter of Anon explicitly cited R-A in its analysis and denied the sex 
trafficking claim to asylum. Id. at 8. 
244 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 473–74 (“[T]he word ‘consent’ has a hollow ring. Even the 
U.S. State Department has acknowledged that ‘it is a vicious myth that women and children 
who work as prostitutes have voluntarily chosen such a life for themselves.’”). 
245 Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum, supra note 69, at 62. 
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D.  Formulations of Nexus 
Asylum law’s construction of “nexus” fails to see individual instances of 
persecution as stemming from a deep-seated societal persecution on the basis 
of gender. Such judicial reasoning is—perhaps most importantly—related to an 
understanding of how fundamental principles of refugee law should be applied 
to the public and private sphere. 
1. Cultural Meaning of the Private Sphere 
Aligned with international human rights principles, US asylum law 
considers that a state must be held to an affirmative duty to eradicate social and 
economic structures that perpetuate female subordination.246 In other words, 
“where a state fails to take affirmative steps to protect battered women from 
intra-familial violence and other forms of gender-based violence, it is complicit 
in creating the harm.”247 States that are “unable or unwilling” to offer 
protection for a particular group are seen as perpetuating such persecution on 
account of that particular group membership.248 Despite recognition of this 
principle, US courts have implicitly—and perhaps at times unconsciously—
created improper dividing lines between the public and private spheres. This 
division relegates refugee women to the latter and precludes them from 
soliciting their state’s duty to offer them protection against systemic, cultural 
female subordination. 
When constructing gender-based asylum claims, courts have repeatedly 
condemned the actions of the persecutor, but limited that condemnation to the 
particularity of the individual situation. For example, in Matter of A-T, the 
court flippantly dismissed Ms. A-T’s claim of forced marriage to her first 
cousin by recasting it as an “arranged marriage” and her fear as a “mere 
reluctance to uphold family tradition” over “personal preference.”249 In another 
                                                        
246 Randall, supra note 2, at 307. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 287. 
249 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1079. 
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sex trafficking case, Matter of H-H, the court denied asylum, explaining that 
the kidnappers, “did not target her for any purpose other than for their own 
criminal enrichment.”250  Furthermore, the IJ explained that Ms. H-H had been 
“randomly targeted” by men she had never seen before “for no other reason 
than her location at that particular moment, her gender, and her age, not 
because the kidnappers bore any personal animus against her on account of one 
of the Act’s enumerated grounds.”251 Though this reasoning in fact 
acknowledges that she was targeted in part on account of her gender, it refuses 
to place a duty on the state to protect women who may be systematically 
sought out for sex trafficking because of their societal position in the private 
sphere. 
Courts especially relegate issues of domestic violence to private spheres, 
implicitly conceding that such locations are beyond the scope of legal redress. 
In Matter of D-K, for example, the BIA found that a domestic violence 
survivor’s claim was not viable because she was not persecuted on account of 
group membership, but merely because her husband was a “despicable 
person.”252 In that case, Ms. Kuna had been beaten, raped, and sustained 
serious injuries during her lengthy marriage to one of President Mobutu’s 
military officers in the former Zaire.253 Even after recognizing the state’s lack 
of protection for survivors of domestic violence, as well as a gender-based 
social group, the IJ denied asylum.254 Notably, the BIA in Matter of D-K 
applied the reasoning of Matter of R-A in its analysis, concluding that the 
persecution could not be linked to either Ms. D-K’s political opinions or to any 
social group. In both cases, the “social visibility” requirement for the social 
group analysis affects the reasoning for nexus because it requires that the 
motivation for the persecution be evident in the public sphere. In Matter of R-
                                                        
250 Knight, supra note 40, at 7 (citing case from Chicago, IL Immigration Court, May 29, 
2003). 
251 Id. 
252 Gender-Based Asylum, supra note 100, at 1535. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
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A, the BIA determined that Ms. Alvarado’s claim failed because “she has not 
shown that women are expected by society to be abused, or that there are any 
adverse societal consequences to women or their husbands if the women are 
not abused.”255 Thus, the court not only required that the group be defined in a 
socially visible manner, but also that the motivation of the persecutor be 
derived from public pressure. Such reasoning fails to consider the inherent 
nature of intimate violence as far removed from the public eye.256 
To a certain extent, this failure by US courts to recognize the duty of a state 
as extending to the private sphere stems from imbedded biases regarding 
cultural differences. Indeed, it has been recognized that “the case of gender-
based persecution appears to go more smoothly when the cultural context can 
be ‘anthropologized’—that is, presented as non-Western, inferior, and usually 
barbaric towards women.”257 The refugee system possesses an ingrained notion 
that “we” of the receiving country have dealt with problems of gender 
violence, and that “they” are very different from us in that regard.258 This 
presumption is ill-founded, especially in light of the United States’ failure to 
protect victims of domestic violence,259 and it leads to the conclusion that 
                                                        
255 Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
906 (AG 2001). 
256 Nevertheless, common rhetoric justifies such reasoning: “How are asylum authorities 
going to substantiate these claims when we know that domestic violence in this country can 
be a complicated thing,” said Ira Mehlman, a spokesman for the advocacy group Federation 
for American Immigration Reform. “This is getting us into personal relationships, and that’s 
not where asylum law ought to go.’” Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in the US, 
supra note 159, at 2. 
257 Randall, supra note 2, at 307–08. 
258 Id. 
259 In 1996, nearly 2,000 murders in the United States were attributable to intimates and 
women suffered around 840,000 rapes, sexual assaults, robbery, aggravated assaults and 
simple assault victimizations by their intimates. Also, women only report half of  violence 
incidents to the police. Reasons for not informing the police include the victims’ belief that 
their victimization was a private or personal matter, fear of retaliation, and feeling that the 
police would not be able to help them. Donovan, supra note 52, at 332–33. 
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refugee law should assume that most states are not able to protect women from 
“private” violence.260 
Based on the above considerations, courts should give wider deference to 
circumstantial evidence when considering gender-based claims in order to 
minimize the manifestation of imbedded cultural biases. This would include a 
consideration of patterns of violence “that are (1) supported by the legal 
system or social norms in the country and (2) reflect a prevalent belief within 
society, or within relevant segments of society, that cannot be deduced by 
evidence of random acts within that society.”261 Furthermore, the sources of 
this information should be scrutinized for accuracy, as country conditions often 
ignore gender issues or have little gender relevance.262 While country of origin 
information may establish that a certain country has adequate legislation in 
place, it rarely provides sufficient detail on whether the legislation is 
implemented or not and is formulated with regard to the adult male 
experience.263 Domestic violence survivors, for example, frequently lack 
corroborating evidence of abuse because police in their home countries simply 
will not respond to their pleas for help.264 
By giving greater weight to circumstantial evidence—and ensuring the 
accuracy of that information—courts can better address the persecution of 
refugee women relegated to the private sphere. Giving greater weight to 
                                                        
260 Randall, supra note 2, at 310. See also Gonzales v. United States, Petition No. 1490-05, 
Inter-am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07, OER/Ser.L/V/II.128, doc. 19 (2007). The Inter-
American Commission accepted a petition by Jessica Gonzales, a domestic violence survivor 
from Colorado whose children were killed when local police failed to enforce a restraining 
order against her estranged husband. The Commission’s decision to admit the petition 
indicated its recognition of “an affirmative duty on States to actually prevent the commission 
of individual crimes by private parties.” Id. at para. 55. 
261 Knight, supra note 40, at 8. Notably, in its brief in Matter of R-A, DHS argued that these 
two specific criteria should be considered in the domestic violence context. See Musalo, A 
Short History of Gender Asylum, supra note 69, at 59. 
262 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 2, 16. 
263 Id. 
264 See, e,g., Matter of R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (BIA 1999) (en banc), vacated, 22 I. & 
N. Dec. 906 (AG 2001) (noting that police failed to intervene or respond to Ms. Alvarado’s 
pleas for help). 
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considerations of cultural context will help offset any imbedded biases that 
would construct refugee women as Others meriting different outcomes. 
2. Bifurcated Approach 
In addressing the problem of finding a causal relationship between a gender-
based ground for persecution and the motivation behind that persecution, 
international tribunals and asylum law scholars have advocated for a bifurcated 
approach to the nexus analysis.265 This provides that the causal link may be 
satisfied: (1) where there is a real risk of being persecuted at the hands of a 
non-state actor for reasons related to one of the Convention grounds, whether 
or not the failure of the state to protect the claimant is Convention-related; or 
(2) where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor is 
unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the 
State to offer protection is for a Convention reason.266 Although courts in 
countries such as England, New Zealand, Australia, and even the United States 
have adopted this approach to find a viable nexus for gender-based claims, the 
bifurcated analysis should still be supplemented by culturally sensitive 
constructions of the private sphere with less emphasis on the persecutor’s 
intent. 
In Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,267 a domestic 
violence-based claim in England, the Lords’ majority found that the claimant 
had been unable to prove nexus for the first prong of the analysis (being 
persecuted by a non-state actor on the basis of one of the Convention grounds), 
but that the second prong (the inability of the state to protect) was satisfied.268 
The court concluded that the “serious harm” of spousal violence was a 
“personal affair, directed against the applicants as individuals” and therefore 
not causally related to their gender-defined social group status.269 Yet, the 
                                                        
265 See id. 
266 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 806. 
267 Id. at 787. 
268 Id. at 789. 
269 Id. . 
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court also noted that the persecution was the result of separate and combined 
efforts of the husband’s violence and the failure of state protection. This latter 
recognition allowed the court to conclude that although the husband’s actions 
were not linked to gender, the state’s failure to protect was—and on this basis, 
a nexus to the particular social group could be established.270 The bifurcated 
approach thus allows courts that fail to see the link between the individual 
persecutor and social group to nonetheless find a nexus based on recognition of 
the state’s obligation to protect victimized women.271 
In employing this formulaic approach, courts still run the risk of ignoring 
cultural context in determining the reasons for which a woman is being 
persecuted, either by an individual aggressor or through the negligence of the 
state. For example, in Islam, it is unclear what evidence the Lords had before 
them regarding the dynamic of domestic violence and its clear gender 
component.272 If the record had reflected a current, more comprehensive 
understanding of domestic violence, it is possible that it would have found a 
Convention reason “inherent in both elements of the persecution,” and thus 
both prongs of the bifurcated analysis.273 
Applying this reasoning to a hypothetical case of sex trafficking, it would 
seemingly be possible for a court to find that a viable asylum claim fails both 
prongs of the bifurcated analysis if cultural and societal context is not 
considered. For example, if an Albanian woman seeks asylum based on her 
membership in the social group “young Albanian woman forced at the threat of 
death to become sex slaves,” a court may likely—as they have done frequently 
in sex trafficking cases274—find that she suffers from mere individualized 
persecution. After failing to find nexus in the first prong of the analysis, the 
                                                        
270 Id. 
271 DHS’s brief in Matter of L-R implicitly advocates for a bifurcated approach even though 
this construction has yet to be officially adopted by US regulation or legislation. Musalo, A 
Short History of Gender Asylum, supra note 69, at 62–63. 
272 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 791. 
273 Id. 
274 Knight, supra note 40, at 1. 
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court could likewise find that the state did not have a duty to protect members 
of that particular group because there were safe places within the country for 
such victims. Indeed, one court facing a similar case found that since Albania 
is “in flux and is being modernized,” the applicant could easily avoid being 
trafficked by relocating to another region of Albania.275 This reasoning 
assumes that the state has provided safe pockets within the country for victims 
of sex trafficking and ignores the reality that trafficking is an international 
phenomenon, facilitated by secret and complex networks of traffickers. It also 
does not recognize that in some countries women may experience severe 
discrimination and social ostracism because they were raped. In fact, DHS has 
noted that this treatment alone may amount to persecution, and UNHCR also 
recognizes that such victims may experience punishment by their family and/or 
the local community.276 Thus, failure to consider the specific social dangers 
faced by victims of trafficking when applying the bifurcated approach would 
create anomalous results.277 
As demonstrated in these case examples, without consideration of the social 
reactions and cultural significance of having been sex-trafficked and 
domestically abused, a court could fail to find nexus by using the bifurcated 
analysis. Thus, while the bifurcated analysis is a helpful step towards proper 
judicial construction of nexus for gender-based claims, its success can only be 
guaranteed with greater emphasis on the role of culture and the nuances of a 
specific society.278 
                                                        
275 Id. at 11. 
276 Id. at 4. 
277 It is also worth noting that social perceptions of consensual prostitution—and the blurred 
lines between this and that of forced prostitution—further complicate views on sex 
trafficking asylum claims. It is important to recognize the social forces that make prostitution 
the sole opportunity for a woman’s survival, as opposed to a voluntary commitment. See 
Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 474. 
278 Contextualizing the social and psychological impact of trauma and abuse must be 
distinguished from rationalizing or justifying mistreatment due to cultural beliefs. The latter 
involves relativistic thinking to perpetuate victimization, while the former allows for 
consideration of cultural factors to equalize humane treatment. 
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3. Intent of the Persecutor 
To establish nexus, courts must essentially look at the motivation of the 
persecutor—a subjective yet crucial determination for any asylum claim. 
Courts, such as the one in Matter of R-A, have explicitly rejected the bifurcated 
approach in favor of an inquiry into the motives of the entity actually inflicting 
the harm.279 This approach is flawed for two primary reasons. First, it places 
the entire focus of the nexus analysis on the relationship between the private 
actor and the victim.280 In doing so, it clouds one of the central purposes of 
refugee law—to provide protection where the state has failed to do so. Second, 
a focus on the intent of the persecutor opens the door for relativist judgments 
on the social norms and practices of other cultures. Again, this is problematic 
because it contravenes a fundamental premise of refugee law—the existence of 
universal human rights. 
In Matter of Kasinga, the court implied that a punitive or malignant intent 
was required by the perpetrator; such an intent was nonexistent in that case. 
Given that the actual perpetrators of violence were the midwives or elders who 
performed FGM, these actors had no intent to punish the victim and 
presumably believed that they were performing an important cultural rite. 
However, the court resolved the case by finding that the societal objectives 
achieved by FGM—gender subordination and an attempt to control female 
sexuality—were not harmless.281 Although the Kasinga court reached a 
positive result for the applicant, it achieved this through a convoluted, 
roundabout analysis that initially emphasized the relationship of the private 
actor to the victim as well as the persecutor’s intent. The latter consideration—
intent—introduces undertones of cultural relativism into the analysis because it 
assumes that the persecutor may have a unique cultural perspective that would 
justify the act. 
                                                        
279 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 803. 
280 Adams, supra note 114, at 293–94. 
281 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 801. 
Refugee Women as Cultural Others 1041 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
Other courts facing different gender-based claims have followed suit in their 
analysis of intent. Specifically, in many cases of sex trafficking, courts deny 
claims because they construct the persecutor’s motive as economic as opposed 
to a Convention ground for asylum.282 Such a construction ignores the fact that 
women are economically disadvantaged because they are women, and 
therefore that merely considering a persecutor’s facially apparent intent fails to 
address the complexities of women’s social reality. For example, in the case of 
one sex trafficking victim, the court considered that there was no evidence that 
the “kidnappers bore any personal animus against her on one of the Act’s 
enumerated grounds.”283 Also, a domestic violence case, Matter of S-A, 
resulted in a grant of asylum after the court considered, with regards to an 
abusive father, that “the record clearly establishes that because of his orthodox 
Muslim beliefs regarding women and his daughter’s refusal to submit . . . the 
respondent’s father treated her different from . . . her male counter-parts 
[sic].”284 
Placing focus on the intent of the persecutor in gender-based asylum claims 
is counterproductive to the basic goals of refugee law. It introduces 
subjectivity into a realm of law that is premised on recognition of objective, 
universal human rights. To avoid anomalous results, courts should not consider 
the intent of the persecutor but should instead engage in a bifurcated analysis 
that properly considers cultural context. 
E. Procedural Safeguards 
This article proposes several jurisprudential constructions for gender-based 
asylum claims that consider the cultural and social sensitivities affecting 
refugee women and that would better facilitate refugee women’s ability to 
obtain asylum. However, in order for these formulations to be properly 
                                                        
282 Pomeroy, supra note 6, at 477. 
283 Knight, supra note 40, at 7 (citing Matter of H-H, A # redacted (Chicago, IL, Immigration 
Court, May 29, 2003)). 
284 Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 12, at 1084. 
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implemented, the procedures for bringing forth these claims must likewise 
provide a manner for all of the relevant information and evidence to be heard. 
The substance of a gender-based claim contains extremely sensitive material 
that a refugee woman may be reluctant to fully disclose under any 
circumstances, much less within the context of an intimidating legal situation. 
This section gives a brief overview of various considerations regarding 
training, interviewing, and the overall court process that are necessary to 
ensure that a female asylum-seeker is given sufficient procedural protections. 
The asylum interview can be an extremely intimidating experience, but it is 
of utmost importance for the applicant to tell the truth and establish 
credibility.285 For example, because refugee women may face a male 
interviewer or interpreter, these circumstances are often not conducive to 
bringing forth gender-related claims.286 In such a situation, a woman may not 
be able to convey her whole story due to a reluctance to speak freely and give a 
full account of the violence she has experienced. Specifically, female 
applicants may fail to respond to questions concerning the type of harm they 
fear, such as sexual abuse.287 Interviewers also may not understand that a lack 
of displayed emotion does not necessarily imply that the woman is not deeply 
affected by the harm she has suffered. The interviewer must consider that 
cultural differences and trauma play important, complex roles in determining 
behavior.288 
One solution to this problem would be to guarantee that interviewers and 
interpreters dealing with female asylum-seekers are women.289 This would 
allow for a more comfortable and safe environment for story sharing, and 
would ultimately lead to better-developed cases. Additionally, both open-
ended and specific questions that may help to reveal gender issues should be 
                                                        
285 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 16. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. 
288 Id. See also Lustig, supra note 95. 
289 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 2. 
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used in asylum interviews. For example, women who have been indirectly 
involved in political activity or to whom political opinions have been attributed 
often do not provide relevant information in their interviews due to the male-
oriented nature of the questioning.290 
Another recurring problem is that officials involved in the asylum procedure 
often lack adequate training on gender issues and thus fail to ask the right 
questions or analyze the evidence before them properly.291 This lack of 
understanding necessitates adequate and ongoing training for immigration and 
refugee decision makers.292 Especially in light of the arbitrariness and variance 
in asylum grants depending on the gender of the adjudicator, proper education 
regarding sensitivity towards gender-based claims is essential.293 Also, 
requiring that national asylum precedents concerning gender-based violence be 
published would help to raise awareness and ensure greater quality and 
consistency within the US system.294 
Ultimately, revising current jurisprudence with gender-sensitive 
formulations of “social group” and “nexus” is only a first step. In order to 
effectuate the goals implicit in such a revision, comprehensive reform of the 
asylum process and its procedures is necessary to sufficiently protect refugee 
women. 
F.  Opening the Floodgates 
It is an early morning at the detention center, and I have accompanied one 
of my colleagues, an immigration attorney, to give a workshop to a group of 
Central American women detainees applying for asylum in the United 
                                                        
290 Id. at 2, 16. 
291 Id. at 2. 
292 Randall, supra note 2, at 304. 
293 In a recent, lengthy study on disparities in asylum grants, the authors highlighted the 
apparent arbitrariness in decision-making by asylum officers and immigration judges. 
Several regional offices have grant rates that deviate from the regional norm by more than 
50%. See Ramji-Nogales, supra note 101, at 372. Notably, female judges grant asylum at a 
rate that is 44 percent higher than that of their male colleagues. Id. at 342. 
294 Council of Europe Report, supra note 19, at 4. 
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States.295 After leading us through a maze of locked doors and rather ominous 
corridors, the guard signals the end of our journey. We will conduct our 
presentation (in Spanish) in the middle of the large, open space at the center of 
an unoccupied unit of individual cells. The group of women—clad in yellow 
jumpsuit prison garb—files into the room. After a few moments of shuffling 
chairs, my colleague launches into an explanation of the asylum process and 
allows for a never-ending stream of questions from the women. Somehow, a 
group of nearly thirty Central American women have recently ended up 
detained here, and almost all of them seek asylum based on domestic or gang 
violence in their home countries. 
As the workshop discussion continues, the insurmountable challenges faced 
by these women become all the more apparent. For one, none of them speak 
English and everything submitted to the court must be translated from Spanish 
to English. One woman explains that she has newspaper articles to include 
with her application, and several others express concerns about translating 
their declarations. Apparently, there is a female detainee (not present) who 
happens to speak English. She has been helping the women write and translate 
their declarations, but she is too afraid to certify the translations with her 
signature (as required by the court) for fear of adverse consequences. Other 
women explain that they do not have any evidence to corroborate their 
declarations: no police records, medical records, news reports. All of these 
challenges are exacerbated by the fact that these women must remain detained, 
constantly working under the shadow of mistrust and fear of the detention 
center staff. None of them have attorneys, and our over-burdened staff (of four 
attorneys, with nearly 1,500 detainees to serve) has little time and resources to 
dedicate to their specific cases. 
Having entered in a state of fear and post-traumatic stress, they had been 
required to disclose the details of their persecution to an immigration officer, 
                                                        
295 This anecdote is based upon my experience as an intern in Tacoma, Washington with the 
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) that conducts a Legal Orientation Program 
(LOP) for unrepresented detained immigrants at the Northwest Detention Center. 
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who makes preliminary determinations about the credibility of their fear. Most 
of the women remain detained while fighting their cases. They do not have the 
language skills or knowledge to tell their stories to the court. And they have no 
one to advocate for them. 
The increased recognition of gender-based asylum claims advocated by this 
article spurs controversy among critics. More specifically, many argue that a 
fair interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or domestic refugee law of the 
United States, does not encompass such claims.296 At the core of such criticism 
is the concern that liberalizing standards for gender-based claims will “open 
the floodgates” to a group of female asylum-seekers too large for the United 
States to practically accommodate.297 As the narrative above exemplifies, 
refugee women face significant procedural barriers in even making their cases 
heard—perhaps a task even more daunting than surpassing the additional 
hurdles of unsympathetic legal frameworks. The fear that floods of refugee 
women will suddenly be granted asylum is therefore unfounded. 
Although US asylum jurisprudence has explicitly recognized that the innate 
characteristics defining a particular social group may be diverse, courts have 
repeatedly denied asylum to women with gender-based claims for reasons of 
broadness.298 In such cases, courts often base their reasoning on the Sanchez-
Trujillo opinion, which stated that a group could not be defined by a “sweeping 
demographic division” where its members “naturally manifest diverse cultures, 
and contrary political leanings.”299 For example, in the case of a sex trafficking 
claim, the IJ ruled that “to accept respondent’s argument would mean that all 
young women in Albania who believe they have been similarly harassed would 
                                                        
296 Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus, supra note 5, at 807. 
297 This fear is evident in the public’s response even to some of the most recent asylum cases, 
such as Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F. 3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010) in July of 2010. See ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Ruling on Women may Spur Asylum Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 16, 2010, at A10. 
298 Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 668 (“Indeed, we have focused on the innate characteristics of such 
broad and internally diverse social groups as homosexuals and Gypsies to conclude that they 
constituted particular social groups for purposes of asylum.”). 
299 Id. (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d at 1571, 156–77 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
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merit asylum, clearly this is not the intent of Congress.”300 In another case, a 
federal court rejected the applicant’s claim in part because “then virtually any 
young Albanian woman who possesses the subjective criterion of being 
‘attractive’ would be eligible for asylum in the United States.”301 
The concern that recognition of gender-based asylum claims will open US 
borders to all refugee women is also contrary to basic principles of refugee 
law. To recognize large social groups situated in structured relationships of 
inequality (no social group being larger than gender) is “antithetical to the 
liberal political tradition that sees the individual as the fundamental unit of 
analysis.”302 However, the assumption that asylum law functions to provide 
categorical relief simply based on group membership is completely 
erroneous.303 In fact, it misses the fundamental goal of this area of refugee law, 
which provides for a case-by-case analysis. Though there may be vast numbers 
of people in the world who suffer oppression and persecution, each individual 
claimant must make her case—after surpassing whatever hurdles are necessary 
to even enter US borders.304 Each applicant must then fit her asylum petition 
into a rigid legal framework, often without the assistance of legal counsel. In 
theory, asylum law provides a “micro-level solution” on a case-by-case basis 
to the “macro-level social, economic, and political problems of the world.”305 
The holistic approach proposed in this article will not result in the granting 
of all gender-based claims. Refugee women must still gather evidence and 
substantiate all of the requirements for an asylum application. For example, in 
the instance of a potential domestic violence claim, harm by a husband may 
not be sufficiently serious to meet the definition of persecution. In other 
claims, there may not be a particularized failure of state protection.306 Even 
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with comprehensive reforms to accommodate gender-based claims, refugee 
women still face many challenges in making their cases that will prevent an 
influx of asylum-seekers.307 The most basic of these challenges, of course, is 
their ability to escape their situation in their country of origin at all.308 
Also, it should be noted that Canada, which began offering protection to 
battered women seeking asylum in 1993, has not yet experienced an upsurge in 
new asylum claims. In the first two years after Canada adopted its guidelines 
recognizing gender-based persecution as a ground for asylum, “approximately 
195 gender-related claims for asylum were granted—about two percent of all 
Canadian asylum claims filed since the guidelines went into effect.”309 
Similarly, the United States has seen no significant increase in FGM-related 
claims since the Matter of Kasinga decision in 1996, nor since the DHS brief 
in Matter of R-A was filed advocating for recognition of domestic violence-
based claims.310 
In addition to these considerations, the excuse that recognition of gender-
based asylum claims will “open the floodgates” to deny asylum claims is 
contrary to the principles of refugee law. Not only do such principles 
emphasize offering protection in individual cases for asylum-seekers, but they 
underscore the ethical need to provide sanctuary to the world’s victimized 
migrants. The stories from Africa and Central America chronicled in this 
article are mere vignettes in a larger portrait of global challenges faced by 
                                                        
307 See Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Standard on 
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refugee women. Ultimately, the law should be shaped by the humanity of 
refugee women’s struggles. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Asylum law is a vehicle through which the United States may define its 
understanding of fundamental human rights. Perhaps for this reason, asylum is 
an extremely convoluted and nuanced realm through which officials, judges, 
and advocates struggle to incorporate a uniform understanding of these rights 
into a rigid legal framework. Refugee women are often cast by the wayside in 
the course of this struggle. In a historically male-dominated world and with a 
male-oriented understanding of human rights, these most vulnerable victims 
cannot make their suffering known unless steps are taken to recognize their 
plight. Yet, current formulations of “social group” and “nexus” within US 
asylum law portray refugee women as cultural Others who are deserving of 
different levels of protection. Both implicitly and explicitly, courts relegate the 
struggles of these women to untouchable private spheres or use relativist 
reasoning to reach anomalous results for gender-based asylum claims. 
Proceeding from a non-relativist understanding of fundamental human 
rights, this article has focused on gender-based claims of FGM, sex trafficking, 
and domestic violence to illustrate both the universality of these rights as well 
as the diversity of gender-based persecution. Despite international recognition 
of the need to protect refugee women and the particularized challenges they 
face, the United States does not reflect this understanding of refugee law in its 
implementation of asylum jurisprudence. In order to eradicate imputed notions 
of cultural Otherness and misunderstanding in asylum jurisprudence, courts 
must restructure their formulations of “social group” and “nexus” to better suit 
the needs of refugee women. “Social group” should be construed to include 
common past experience as an immutable characteristic, and courts should not 
misconstrue gender-related claims to fit under other Convention grounds, 
thereby perpetuating judicial evasion of gender issues. Visibility should not be 
weighted for constructions of “social group” in gender-based claims because 
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this fails to recognize the societal roles of refugee women in the private sphere. 
Furthermore, nexus should be formulated through a bifurcated approach that 
includes a deep cultural understanding of the private sphere and does not 
emphasize the intent of the persecutor. These constructions allow for 
consideration of cultural and social sensitivities that affect gender-based claims 
while avoiding relativist undertones of cultural Otherness. 
Yet, these jurisprudential modifications can only be effectuated with proper 
procedural modifications that likewise recognize the plight of refugee women. 
Providing gender-sensitive safeguards through the interview process and 
offering training for asylum officials are both reasonable solutions to 
procedural challenges. Finally, widespread criticism that recognition of 
gender-based claims will open the floodgates to an influx of female asylum-
seekers is not only unfounded, but it contravenes fundamental principles of 
refugee law that emphasize individualized protections for victims of 
persecution. 
As a part of an increasingly globalized society—and especially as a nation 
of immigrants—the United States has a special obligation to uphold 
fundamental concepts of human rights. Refugee women constitute one of the 
world’s most vulnerable populations because they can so easily become 
socially invisible through oppressive societal norms. It is therefore all the more 
important that asylum law—which has the purpose of protecting such 
victims—does not further relegate women by creating conceptual hurdles in 
rigid legal frameworks. Instead of constructing box-like analytical 
formulations that treat refugee women as vastly different cultural products, US 
asylum law must better translate the universality of human rights into more 
fluid formulations embracing cultural differences. 
 
 
